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Within the realm of social cognition, brain injury research has increasingly focussed
on a specific element of social competence: the ability to attribute mental states (e.g.
thoughts, feelings, desires, and beliefs) in order to explain and predict people's
behaviour. This study was conducted in order to investigate this component of
everyday social understanding commonly referred to as 'theory of mind' (ToM) in
post-stroke individuals. The aims were to investigate whether lesions to particular
areas of the brain are more detrimental to ToM ability compared to others and
investigate the relationship between ToM ability and executive function following
stroke.
Design
This study was of mixed factorial design and compared the performance of stroke
patients (right-hemisphere stroke, n = 15; left-hemisphere stroke, n = 15) to that of
controls (n = 40) matched for age, years of education and IQ on tasks believed to
measure theory ofmind and executive function.
Method
All participants were seen on one occasion and undertook psychometric testing.
Information gained at these times was analysed to investigate the differences and
associations between the groups' (stroke vs controls) performances on each of the
measures used in this study.
Results
Significant differences were found between the groups' performances on the ToM
task with results suggesting lesions to the right hemisphere as being particularly
detrimental to ToM ability. Positive associations were found between performance
on the ToM task and measures of executive function, although deficits in executive
functioning could not fully account for the difficulties shown by stroke patients on
the ToM task.
Conclusions
The findings of this study suggest that right hemisphere damage following stroke is
particularly detrimental to an aspect of social cognition commonly referred to as
ToM. Impaired ability to attribute mental states to others can interfere with how
individuals use information conveyed through social interaction and can, in turn,
affect psychosocial functioning, disrupt interpersonal relationships, and lead to
reduced quality of life. The findings of this study are discussed in relation to
implications for the individual and rehabilitation progress. Methodological issues,





1.1.1 Definition and Classification of Stroke
Stroke or cerebral vascular accident (CVA) is an umbrella term that includes
different pathologies and clinical syndromes. It can be broadly defined as the sudden
loss of blood supply to a region of the brain resulting in persistent neurological
symptoms, lasting more than 24 hours, and permanent tissue damage or infarction
(Robinson, 1998). As a consequence, wide-ranging disruption of function in the
brain can follow depending on the area or areas of the brain affected and extent of
damage incurred.
There are many ways to classify the range of disorders that are referred to as stroke.
Classification of cerebrovascular disease can be based on either the cerebral vessels
occluded, the cause of the vessel disease, or the means by which tissue damage
occurs. Robinson (1998), however, suggests the latter classification as being the
most pragmatic and outlines a classification of cerebrovascular disease based not on
the aetiologies of underlying anatomical-pathological processes, which would be
many and complex, but rather by using the means by which these processes manifest
themselves. Using this classification system, based on the cause of tissue damage,




Ischaemic strokes occur when one of the arteries carrying blood to the brain becomes
blocked or occluded by either cerebral thrombosis or cerebral embolism. Cerebral
thrombosis is the process by which a thrombus or clot forms in an artery supplying
blood to the brain and can be caused by either a blood clot or a build up of
atherosclerotic plaques or fatty deposits. The latter type of deposit is the most
common source of obstruction of blood flow to the brain, causing 60% to 70% of all
strokes and more than 75% of obstructive strokes (Bogousslavsky, Hommel, &
Basetti, 1998). A thrombus is more likely to block the flow of blood if the lining of
the artery has become narrowed or hardened over the years by cholesterol, a process
referred to as atherosclerosis. This type of stroke is, therefore, more common in
older individuals.
As a result of this atherosclerotic process, thrombotic strokes can either develop
gradually, evolving for hours or days, or suddenly, with an acute presentation of
neurological symptoms. The effects of this type of cerebrovascular disease can be
wide-ranging from very minor to the catastrophic infarction of a large area of a
particular hemisphere. More than two thirds of strokes resulting from atherosclerotic
lesions involve posterior frontal, temporal, and parietal structures in the region fed by
the middle cerebral artery (Neau & Bogousslavsky, 2001). When the vertebrobasilar
system is involved, infarcts are commonly seen in the brainstem, inferior temporal
lobe, and occipital lobes. Generally, the size of the region affected will often depend
on the size of the blood vessel occluded.
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Cerebral embolism is another way ischaemic stroke can occur and is due to an
embolus or clot that has formed elsewhere in the body, broken away, and travelled
through the blood vessels to the brain resulting in a blockage. Cerebral embolism
accounts for approximately one third of all strokes (Robinson, 1998) and is most
commonly caused by a piece of a thrombus breaking away within the heart and
travelling up the carotid artery (see Figure 1.). The causes of thrombus formation
within the heart can include cardiac arrhythmias, congenital heart disease and
infectious processes. This type of stroke has the most rapid onset of all ischaemic
strokes and can occur at any time without warning although, in some cases, can
begin with fluctuating symptoms over the course of one or two days. Embolic
strokes are often associated with heart disease, and tend to occur at an earlier age.
Similar to the effects resulting from cerebral thrombosis, a large embolus may
occlude a major vessel such as the internal carotid artery with more severe
consequences, or, if the embolus is small in size, it may result in a transient
neurological deficit. This may resolve in time as the embolus fragments and travels
into smaller more distal arteries with less obvious neurological consequences.
Lacunar infarctions result from occlusion of smaller penetrating cerebral arteries and
account for nearly one fifth of all strokes (Robinson, 1998). Again, the effects of the
occlusion of these more distal arteries depend on the brain region involved.
However, they may produce no observable deficits, or be associated with pure motor
or sensory deficits. There is a significant association between lacunae and both
hypertension and atherosclerosis, suggesting that this type of infarction is the result
of the atherosclerotic process extending into smaller vessels.
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Transient Ischaemic Attacks (TIAs) or 'mini strokes' also fall within the category of
ischaemic disorders and are defined as periods of transient focal ischaemia associated
with reversible neurological deficits (Hennerici, Bogousslavsky & Sacco, 2004).
These attacks can vary in duration from a few minutes to a few hours, up to an
accepted recovery period of 24 hours (Ross-Russell, 1983). During a TIA, the
individual will usually experience a sudden loss of neurological function, such as
motor ability, which resolves as the clot passes to a less occluded part of the artery
allowing blood flow to resume. Until recently TIAs were believed not to cause
stroke. However, the development of more sophisticated imaging technology has
shown that infarction to the brain can occur even when clinical symptoms have
resolved rapidly (Bogousslavsky et al., 1998). TIAs are usually indicative of a
thrombotic process occurring and may precede, accompany or follow the
development of a full stroke.
The most frequent location for cerebral infarctions is the distribution of the middle
cerebral artery. Thrombosis or emboli which occlude the large-diameter vessels on
the lateral surface of the brain produce the largest lesions. Posterior circulation
lesions affecting the brain stem, or penetrating arterial lesions affecting subcortical
structures, usually produce small focal or lacunar lesions (Robinson, 1998).
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Figure 1. Schematic lateral view of the brain showing the major arterial
vessels.
The internal carotid gives rise to the anterior and middle cerebral arteries. The vertebral-
basilar arteries constitute the posterior circulation including the posterior cerebral
hemispheres, brain stem, cerebellum, and medial subcortical structures (Taken from
Robinson, 1998).
1.1.3 Haemorrhagic Stroke
Strokes can also result from bleeding within and around the brain from a ruptured
blood vessel. This type of stroke is referred to as haemorrhagic stroke ofwhich there
are two main types. The first is referred to as intracerebral haemorrhage (ICH)
resulting from arterial rupture, which causes bleeding within the brain itself. There
are a variety of causes, but commonly this type of stroke is associated with
hypertension, or the rupture of saccular aneurysms or arteriovenous malformations
(AVMs). The second is referred to as subarachnoid haemorrhage (SAH), which is
caused by a ruptured vessel, usually from an aneurysm, bleeding into the
subarachnoid space that surrounds the brain. The bleeding results in damage to the
surrounding brain tissue, which may also be exacerbated by pressure effects causing
the surrounding tissue to be either displaced or compressed if the bleeding continues.
In these cases, the blood forms a mass that behaves like a space-occupying lesion.
Haemorrhagic stroke is characterised by its sudden onset Such events are only
accompanied by headache in about 50% of cases and may therefore occur with little
or no prior warning signs (Bogousslavsky et al., 1998). Intracranial haemorrhage is
the fourth most frequent cause of stroke and accounts for about one-seventh of all
strokes (Robinson, 1998). It can be fatal in severe cases and where vital areas of the
brain are affected.
1.1.4 Oxford Classification of Stroke
As stated previously, stroke can be sub-categorised in different ways. However,
Bamford (1992) highlights that stroke remains a clinical diagnosis, not withstanding
the many technological advances of the past 20 years or so, and argues that for
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clinicians concerned with secondary prevention, rehabilitation, and acute stroke
intervention, this 'one-stage' diagnosis is inadequate. Clinically, subclassifications
have assumed greater importance and therefore it seems prudent to briefly outline the
classification system of stroke developed by Bamford and colleagues, which is
commonly used in clinical settings.
Bamford and Sandercock (1991), using data from the Oxford Community Stroke
project (n = 675), defined four sub-categories of cerebral infarction on the basis of
presenting signs and symptoms: lacunar infarcts (LACI); total anterior circulation
infarcts (TACI); partial anterior circulation infarcts (PACI); and posterior circulation
infarcts (POCI). This system of classification is presented in Table 1.
Table 1. The Oxford Community Stroke Project classification of sub-types of




A pure motor stroke, a pure sensory stroke, a sensori¬
motor stroke, or an ataxic hemiparesis
Total anterior circulation infarcts
(TACI)
A combination of new higher cerebral dysfunction
(speech disturbance), homonymous visual field
defect and ipsilateral motor and/or sensory deficit
of at least two areas (out of face, arm and leg)
Partial anterior circulation infarcts
(PACI)
Only two of the three components of a TACI, or
with higher cerebral dysfunction alone, or with a
motor/sensory deficit more restricted than those
classified as LACI (e.g. confined to one limb)
Posterior circulation infarcts
(POCI)
Any of: ipsilateral cranial nerve palsy with
contralateral motor and/or sensory deficit;
bilateral motor and/or sensory deficit; disorder of
conjugate eye movement; cerebellar dysfunction;
isolated homonymous visual field defect
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While the classification is based upon bedside clinical features, the labels attached to
each subcategory are anatomical, which Bamford (1992) argues reflects the close
correlation between signs and symptoms and site of cerebral infarction. The
advantage of using this classification is that it uses relatively simple clinical criteria.
The disadvantages are that it does not extend to subarachnoid haemorrhage or
intracerebral haemorrhage, and that for lacunar strokes, the relationship between
clinical classification and anatomical site may not be very close (Allder, Moody,
Martel et al., 2003).
1.1.5 Epidemiology
Epidemiological studies suggest that haemorrhagic strokes account for 15-20% and
ischaemic strokes for 80-85% of all stroke events (Robinson, 1998). However,
incidence rates are often difficult to quantify because this would require
identification of all new stroke cases. Often, mild strokes go unrecognised and
unevaluated, and severe strokes may result in sudden death. Immediate mortality is
high, with around 1 in 5 individuals with stroke dying within 30 days (The Scottish
Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN), 2002). Incidence increases significantly
with age.
Stroke has a major impact on people's lives. It is the biggest cause of severe
disability and a common cause of death in the United Kingdom and other developed
countries. Over 100,000 people in England and Wales have a first stroke each year
(BPS, 2002). The number of individuals living with stroke and its consequences in
Scotland is around 70,000, with approximately 15,000 new cases estimated annually
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(SIGN, 2002). The Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (2002) report stroke
as being the third most common cause of death in Scotland and the most frequent
cause of severe disability, with a substantial proportion of health and social care
resources being devoted to the immediate and continuing care of people who have
suffered a stroke (Department ofHealth (DoH), 2001).
1.2 Consequences of stroke
The consequences of stroke can vary significantly among individuals. As outlined
above, in some individuals there may be no obvious consequences from a
cerebrovascular event, while in others the extent of impairment can be catastrophic.
This is primarily due to the location and extent of lesion. Factors such as age and sex
are also known to influence the type of stroke experienced and the general associated
physical and neuropsychological consequences (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004;
Damasio, Tranel, Spradling & Allinger, 1989). Wade and colleagues investigated
individuals 3 weeks post stroke and reported hemiplegic limbs, communication
difficulties, memory problems and perceptual deficits as being common problems
amongst survivors of stroke (Wade, Langton-Hewer, Skillbeck & David, 1985).
1.2.1 Motor/Physical
Large artery strokes tend to produce significant behavioural changes. This is either
due to direct damage to cortical areas or disruption of large subcortical areas. If the
stroke has occurred because of obstruction of smaller arteries then fewer behavioural
changes may be seen. The degree of impairment is also directly related to the
location and extent of lesion, and as stated above, can vary greatly among
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individuals. However, despite these variations, there are patterns of deficits that are
common. One of the most frequent problems after stroke is motor dysfunction.
Weakness, heaviness or paralysis down one side of the body is apparent, contra¬
lateral to the side of lesion. This may affect an arm or leg, the face, or the whole of
one side of the body. Swallowing difficulties or dysphagia, loss of bladder and/or
bowel control and somatosensory changes are also common. These motor
difficulties can be very pronounced at time of onset and during the early course of
recovery, but as swelling reduces in the brain and other physiological secondary
effects of the stroke return to normal, the concomitant impairments also usually
decrease (Hennerici et al., 2004).
1.2.2 Cognition
Besides physical handicaps, cognitive disorders following stroke can also contribute
to disability in every day life (McKinlay & Brooks, 1984) and usually result from
damage to the forebrain regions.
Stroke has been found to lead to specific cognitive deficits such as aphasia, apraxia,
and neglect, but also affects general cognitive functions such as memory, attention
and executive functioning (Hochstenbach, Mulder, van Limbeek et al., 1998;
Rasquin, Verhey, Lousberg et al., 2002; Stephens, Kenny, Rowan et al., 2004).
Variations in presentation of cognitive deficits are also seen depending on which
hemisphere of the brain has been damaged. The most obvious cognitive disorders
for those individuals with right-sided damage involve visuospatial abilities and
gestalt-type concept formation (Lezak et al., 2004). Left-sided visual neglect, often
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viewed as being characteristic of stroke, is also common following right-sided stroke.
For example, Heir, Mondlock and Caplan (1983) found that 85% of the 41
individuals in their study with right-sided stroke displayed signs of left-sided neglect.
In contrast, disorders of language, such as aphasia, are commonly seen in stroke
patients with left-sided damage to the brain (Lezak et al., 2004; Clarke, 2001).
Factors other than location of lesion have also been found to predict cognitive
impairment following stroke. In a study conducted by Rasquin and colleagues (n =
176), older age and low educational level were found to be predictors of cognitive
disorders in post-stroke survivors (Rasquin, Verhey, van Oostenbrugge et al., 2004b).
In addition to the cognitive deficits that can be quite pronounced following stroke,
such as aphasia and neglect, mild cognitive impairments are also common. For
example, Rasquin, Lodder and Ponds et al. (2004a) investigated the frequency of
post-stroke mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and its clinical course after first-ever
stroke in a sample of 196 patients (mean age 68). These authors found the frequency
of post-stroke MCI to be high, with almost 65% of patients experiencing multiple
cognitive deficits, with mental speed and calculation reported as the most frequently
disturbed cognitive functions. Rasquin et al., (2004a) concluded that whilst most
patients were found to have MCI, improvement of cognitive function was seen at 6
and 12 months follow-up. However, they highlighted that some patients did not
show improvement in all domains investigated.
Despite individuals often experiencing wide-ranging deficits in cognitive functioning
following stroke, subjective data on changes after stroke showed that patients and
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their relatives' rated mental slowness first on a list of cognitive complaints
(Hochstenbach et al. 1998). This is in keeping with results found by Rasquin et al.
(2004a) and suggests that mental slowness is a common consequence of stroke.
Gerritsen, Berg, and Deelman et al. (2003) investigated speed of information
processing following stroke. They studied 42 right and 46 left hemisphere first-ever
stroke patients and compared their performance to 71 healthy controls on reaction
time tasks with different levels of complexity. Gerritsen and colleagues found that
stroke caused a decrease in decision making speed, and differential effects of right
(RHD) and left hemisphere damage (LHD). The right hemisphere group were slower
than the control participants, and slower than the left hemisphere group on all tasks.
LHD patients were slower than the controls only on the most complex tasks.
Similarly, Hochstenbach, Mulder and Limbeek et al. (1998) investigated the
performance of 229 (140 males, 89 women) patients who had suffered a stroke using
an extensive neuropsychological battery of tests. These authors found more than 70%
of individuals showed marked slowness of information processing. At least 40% of
all patients had difficulty with memory, visuospatial and constructive tasks, language
skills, and arithmetic. Further analyses revealed that performance was better after
right-sided lesions than after left-sided lesions, with the exception of visuospatial
tasks. However, details were not provided with regards to the numbers in each of the
stroke groups (left versus right sided lesion) and many of the tasks had a high verbal
component. Presumably this would have greatly affected those individuals with left-
sided lesions, given that the left hemisphere is typically dominant for language.
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As outlined above, the severity and type of cognitive impairments following stroke
can vary significantly amongst individuals and can disrupt processes central to social
interaction and communication. These include language, visual perception, attention
and memory difficulties. A high incidence of mild cognitive impairments has also
been found. As such, Riepe and colleagues advocate formal brief cognitive
screening for all stroke patients (Riepe, Riss, Bittner & Huber, 2004).
1.2.3 Affect
Mood disorders following stroke are common (estimates of between 25 to 50 per
cent) and are associated with symptoms such as withdrawal, apathy and irritability
(Robinson, 1998). Robinson (1998) describes depression as one of the most frequent
emotional disorders experienced by stroke survivors that has an impact on
rehabilitation outcome and recovery. One of the first studies to examine post-stroke
mood disorders was conducted by Folstein, Maiberger, and McHugh (1977). These
authors found that stroke patients were more frequently depressed than patients with
orthopaedic problems who had comparable physical impairments. Since then,
disorders of affect following stroke have continued to be studied extensively,
although the prevalence of post-stroke depression varies depending upon the
population being studied. Based on a community sample (n = 379), Wade, Legh-
Smith and Hewer (1987) found that 3 weeks after stroke 22% of patients were
depressed using a cut-off score on the Wakefield Inventory. The prevalence of
depression in hospitalised patients with acute stroke has been found to be similar to
that found in outpatient samples (Robinson, Starr, Kubos, & Price, 1983). Among a
consecutive series ofpatients admitted to a rehabilitation hospital, Sinyor, Amato and
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Kaloupek (1987) reported prevalence rates for mild, moderate, and severe depression
as 17%, 23%, and 9% respectively. Piamarta and colleagues (2004) examined
affective symptoms in the early post-stroke period (age range 60-88) and found
moderate associations between apathy and both executive functions and mood levels
(Piamarta, Iurlaro, Isella et al., 2004).
There are mixed findings reported in the literature regarding the role that each of the
hemispheres play in depression following brain injury. Some studies report that
depression after stroke is the result of left-hemisphere lesions (Robinson, et al.,
1984), whereas other studies report a greater incidence of depression after right-
hemisphere lesions (Dam, Pederson, & Ahlgren, 1989). Depression is also a
frequent finding in patients with frontal lobe lesions (Starkstein & Robinson, 1991).
However, despite these findings, it is clear that depression may also occur as a
psychological reaction to a catastrophic life event.
Anxiety is another emotional disorder commonly seen following stroke and is
associated with physiological arousal, verbal reports of feelings of distress, and overt
avoidance behaviour (Robinson, 1998). Approximately 25-50% of patients have
been found to present with anxiety disorders in the acute phase of stroke, whereas the
prevalence is slightly less at one year and a 3 years follow-up (Astrom, Adolfsson, &
Asplund, 1993). Similar to depression, existing data about the relationship of anxiety
with the location of lesion are not conclusive (Carota, Staub, & Bogousslavsky,
2002).
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These findings suggest that anxiety and depression are frequently associated with
stroke and have been shown to impact on recovery rates and rehabilitation outcomes.
Because of their nature, these types of affective disorders are also very likely to
impact on residual cognitive functioning, psychosocial functioning, and the
individual's quality of life.
1.2.4 Emotion
In addition to causing physical and cognitive impairments and changes in affect,
stroke can cause changes in the way stroke patients express, experience or
comprehend emotions (Elinger, Parkinson & Shamay, 2002; Bogousslavsky, 2003).
Such emotion-related processing disorders can interfere with how individuals use
emotional information conveyed through social interaction and can, in turn, affect
psychosocial functioning (Eslinger et al., 2002). The kinds of emotional disorders
associated with stroke may range from depression (see section 1.2.3) to personality
change with irritability, apathy, or emotional withdrawal (Robinson, 1998).
Emotional lability or 'emotionalism' is also characteristic of stroke, particularly
following damage to the right hemisphere (Rolls, 1999). This phenomenon of crying
or laughing out of proportion to the underlying feelings of sadness or happiness can
start with little or no warning and can therefore be a source of embarrassment to the
individual. It can also lead to withdrawal from social situations. A review
conducted by Carota et al. (2002) reported that emotional lability is frequent in acute
stroke (40%), at one month post stroke (21%), but shows a decline over the first 6
months (15-21%). Several studies have found a consistent prevalence of
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approximately 20% of patients experiencing pathological laughing or crying at some
time during the first year following stroke (Anderson, 1995; House, Dennis &
Molyneau et ah, 1989).
Neuroanatomical structures related to emotion have been identified at different levels
of the nervous system, including cortical, subcortical and limbic areas. The most
common sites of cerebrovascular disease affecting emotion-related processing are the
right hemisphere and frontal lobe (Zgaljardic, Borod & Sliwinski, 2002); Borod,
Andelman, Obler et ah, 1992). These regions encompass neocortical as well as
paralimbic structures that sub-serve different aspects of emotional communication.
Current models of emotion and the brain emphasise a vital role for the posterior right
hemisphere and amygdala in the accurate perception of emotional stimuli, such as
prosody (inflections of voice) and emotional facial expressions, and for the frontal
lobe in the regulation and expression of emotion (Carota et ah 2002). The left
hemisphere is normally viewed as dealing with the verbal content of emotional
stimuli. Damage to the thalamic regions of the brain can lead to a reduction in
emotional capacity and responsiveness, including flat affect and apathy (Butters &
Stuss, 1989). However, transient manic type episodes have been reported in
individuals with right thalamic lesions (Cummings & Mendez, 1984).
The above research findings demonstrate that there are a number of factors that
influence emotional functioning after stroke. These include the location of lesion
and the mode of the emotional stimuli. It is also understandable how these kinds of
difficulties can interfere with social functioning following stroke.
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1.2.5 Recovery of Function and Rehabilitation
Recovery from stroke depends on many different factors including the location and
extent of the lesion, a person's age, and their general health before the stroke. If no
further stroke occurs, there are usually significant spontaneous improvements in both
physical and mental functioning, although again this can be variable. This is
primarily due to the reduction in swelling of the brain around the site of stroke
allowing some of the affected cells to recover their function (Marciano, Green, &
Stachowiak, 1992).
In addition to this process of spontaneous recovery, there is also strong evidence that
stroke rehabilitation improves functional outcome and enhances quality of life
(Jeffrey & Good, 1995; Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN), 2002).
However, anosognosia (lack of awareness) has been shown to have a detrimental
effect on rehabilitation progress and hence recovery. Anosognosia is defined as the
partial or complete unawareness of a deficit and can be inconsistent across physical,
cognitive and affective domains. Hartmann-Maeir, Soroker, Ring, and Katz (2002)
investigated the awareness of deficit profiles of stroke patients (n = 60; right-sided
lesion, n = 36, and left-sided lesion, n = 24) undergoing rehabilitation and examined
the impact of unawareness on rehabilitation functional outcomes. These authors
reported that the frequency of unawareness for motor and sensory deficits was low,
whereas unawareness of cognitive deficits much higher. The results also indicated
that unawareness at admission to rehabilitation in the right-hemisphere damaged
group was a detrimental factor in achieving independence in basic activities of daily
living functions (ADLs).
17
Hochstenbach et al. (2003) compiled an inventory of emotional and cognitive
changes reported by patients (n = 65) and significant others 9 months after stroke
onset. These authors concluded that emotional and cognitive changes following
stroke are experienced by 50% of stroke patients and their relatives. Most frequently
mentioned changes by patients and partners, irrespective of side of lesion, were
mental slowness, memory disabilities, less initiative and emotional lability.
However, agreement between patients and relatives was low and one of the relevant
patient-related factors was the amount of awareness of deficits the patient displayed.
Several studies have found that impaired awareness of deficits following brain injury
is more commonly associated with right-sided stroke (Giacino and Cicerone, 1998;
Starkstein, Federoff, Price, Leiguarda & Robinson, 1992). More specifically,
McGlynn and Schacter (1989) suggest that unawareness of perceptual and motor
deficits involves parietal damage, while unawareness of complex deficits such as
cognitive and behavioural changes involves frontal damage.
As outlined in section 1.2.2, cognitive deficits can also have a detrimental effect on
recovery. Galski, Bruno, Zorowitz and Walker (1993) studied 36 patients after
stroke and found that higher cognitive impairments involving comprehension
judgement, short-term verbal memory and abstract thinking were of primary
importance in extending the length of stay in hospital. Higher cognitive impairments
also necessitated the need for outpatient and home services after discharge.
Similarly, Zinn and colleagues also found that cognitive impairments affect recovery
of independent ADLs (Zinn, Dudley & Hayden et al., 2004).
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Although it may be debated whether physical, cognitive or emotional impairments
are the most frequent and devastating consequence of stroke, a high proportion of
patients must cope with serious permanent cognitive decline (Hochstenbach, den
Otter, & Mulder, 2003; Patel, Coshall, Rudd, & Wolfe, 2003). In addition, there is
an abundance of evidence that shows emotional disorders constitute one of the major
obstacles to recovery and to achieving maximal quality of life following stroke (see
sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4). Remarkably, however, many of the policy documents,
guidelines, and rehabilitation research have tended to focus on physical or motor
aspects of stroke. More recently the cognitive and affective consequences of stroke
have been highlighted, with emphasis being placed on the implications for
assessment and rehabilitation process if these are not addressed. Relatively little
attention has been paid however to the emotional or social functioning problems
which occur in stroke patients.
1.3 Executive Function
The frontal lobes of the brain play an essential role in behaviour, cognition and
emotion. Therefore damage to these structures can result in a variety of difficulties in
a number of areas of functioning, such as language, executive functions, and social
functioning (Lezak et al., 2004). In particular, the frontal lobes have been found to
be implicated in distinctive 'frontal' syndromes, predominantly following damage to
the pre-frontal, medial-frontal and orbito-frontal areas (Robinson, 1998; Wilson et
al., 1996). Individuals with damage to these areas can display difficulties with
inhibition, impulsivity and social inappropriateness amongst others.
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One of the most famous cases of injury to the frontal lobes was that of Phineus Gage.
He was reported in 1878 to have survived an explosion that blasted an iron bar
upwards through his left frontal lobe, and to have no gross neurological disability as
a consequence (Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994). The
angle at which the iron bar entered Gage's skull however meant that he probably
sustained additional injury to the right frontal region of the cortex. Following the
trauma, marked personality and behavioural changes were noted. The clinical
presentation was one of disinhibited, irritable behaviour as well as a lack of drive and
motivation. He was also reported as showing poor judgement, using obscene
language and being inconsiderate towards others. These behavioural changes were
in direct contrast to how he was reported to have behaved prior to his accident. This
case highlights that the frontal lobes subserve a range of cognitive and behavioural
functions, and that specific damage to these areas can result in profound personality
and behavioural changes.
Regions of the frontal cortex have been shown to have multiple reciprocal
connections with subcortical structures including the basal ganglia, midbrain, and
pons, and individuals with damage to these structures have also been found to
display similar difficulties to those outlined above (Grafman, Sirigu, Spector &
Hendler, 1993). Thus, damage to subcortical structures or disruption in these
interconnections or systems can present as 'frontal' symptomatology, in the absence
of specific damage to the frontal lobes (Benton, 1991). This suggests that the frontal
lobes, in addition to having a specific significance to given cognitive functions, are
also part of a wider neural network that incorporates subcortical structures.
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Throughout the literature terms such as 'frontal functioning' and 'executive
functioning' are used interchangeably to denote the wide-ranging cognitive functions
and behaviours associated with the frontal lobes (Stuss & Benson, 1986). However,
the findings highlighted above suggest this may be somewhat misleading. In
addition, Phillips (1997) highlights the many difficulties with considering executive
function as being analogous to frontal functioning. Individuals with lesions that do
not involve the frontal lobes have been found to perform poorly on tests of executive
functioning and, conversely, individuals with frontal lobe lesions have been found to
perform within the normal range on these tasks. Therefore, the term executive
function will be used in this piece ofwork and more clearly defined below.
According to Burgess and Shallice (1997), executive functions refer to the high-level
cognitive processes that underlie flexible goal-directed behaviour. These include
processes such as goal selection, planning, monitoring, sequencing, and other
supervisory processes, which permit the individual to impose organisation and
structure upon his or her environment. In other words, executive functioning
underlies how behaviour is expressed (Lezak et al., 2004).
Executive functioning is viewed as being closely linked to a range of cognitive
functions. However, Lezak et al. (2004) highlight executive functions differ from
cognitive functions in an important way. Impairments in executive functions tend to
have a more global impact affecting all aspects of behaviour, regardless of whether
specific cognitive abilities remain relatively intact. Whereas when executive
functions are intact, an individual can sustain considerable cognitive loss. This may
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be why executive functioning has been viewed by many as analogous to the
conductor of an orchestra; it has an influence that is greater than the sum of its
component parts.
Evidence from neuropsychological and functional imaging studies suggests that
different aspects of executive functions are dissociable and are mediated by distinct
neural systems subserved by different regions of the prefrontal cortex (Burgess &
Shallice, 1997; Damasio, 1998). This may account for the multiple and varied
behavioural changes seen when executive functioning is impaired, and for the
variability between individuals. However, executive functioning deficits are
commonly associated with personality change, cognitive deficits in specific domains,
and altered psychosocial and emotional functioning.
In addition to localised lesions accounting for deficits in executive functioning, there
is also evidence indicating that the prefrontal cortex undergoes a marked
deterioration as a function of normal ageing. Mittenberg, Seidenberg, O'Leary, and
DiGiulio (1989) gave a neuropsychological test battery to people of varying ages
(20-75 years) and found that the strongest correlations were between age and
measures of frontal performance. This suggests that reduced executive functioning
performance may result from the normal ageing process as well as from specific
lesions in the frontal lobes and connected structures.
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1.3.1 Executive Function and Stroke
The executive functions are highly sensitive to brain damage and executive
dysfunction is therefore the most common presenting problem in neuropsychological
practice (Stuss & Levine, 2002). In cases of neurological pathology, a number of
researchers have documented deficits in executive functioning following damage to
the frontal lobes, such as cerebrovascular disease, as well as lesions following
traumatic brain injury (e.g. Delia Sala, Gray, Spinnler, & Traveli, 1998). Executive
impairments have also been found to be particularly important in determining
rehabilitation and psychosocial outcomes (Crepeau & Scherzer, 1993; Vilkki, Ahola,
Hoist et al., 1994). Therefore, it is highly likely that a significant proportion of
individuals in post-stroke rehabilitation wards will experience a range of difficulties
associated with impairments in this area of cognitive functioning.
In relation to the different presentations commonly seen after frontal lobe damage,
Stuss and colleagues (2001) highlight damage to the left or right orbitofrontal areas
consistently causes personality changes, impaired social judgement, diminished
affective responsiveness and indifference, impaired pragmatics, problems with self-
regulation, and inability to make use of feedback or previous experience. The
anterior regions of the frontal lobes appear to be more important in drive, attention,
motivation and inhibition of socially inappropriate behaviour (Robinson, 1998).
Thus, damage to specific or localised areas of the frontal lobes should be associated
with disrupted, but recognisable, patterns of behaviours, cognitive deficits or changes
in emotional function (see Stuss & Levine, 2002). However, the exact nature of the
frontal lobes is a matter of continued speculation due to the varied presentation and
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pattern of impairments following lesions to this area of the cortex. It is often the case
that some individuals present with quite pronounced deficits in cognitive functioning
and/or changes in personality, whereas others show little obvious signs of
impairment in day to day functioning (see Lezak et al., 2004).
Nonetheless, intact executive functioning is arguably critical to everyday life and
enables individuals to initiate, monitor and terminate behaviour patterns (Phillips,
1997). Deficits in executive functioning have also been linked to psychosocial
impairments, particularly in relation to the recognition of emotional expression
(Borod et al. 1992; Zgalijardic et al., 2002), reduced empathy (Carota, Staub, &
Bogousslavsky, 2002), and socially inappropriate behaviours (Hornak, Rolls, &
Wade, 1996; Rolls, Homack, Wade & McGrath, 1994). Impairments in all these
areas may be observed in post-stroke patients (see Robinson, 1998), with the latter
being the changes families often have the most difficulty in dealing with (Brooks &
McKinlay, 1983). Executive impairments have also been found to be particularly
important in determining rehabilitation and psychosocial outcomes (Crepeau &
Scherzer, 1993; Villki, Ahola, Hoist et al., 1994).
1.4 Social Functioning
In some ways social functioning is an all-encompassing term that comprises many
different abilities or skills, which have all been studied extensively in different
contexts and with different individual populations (Bach, Davies, Colvin et al., 1998;
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Cicone, Wapner & Gardner, 1980; Cuerva, Sabe, Kuzis et
al., 2001; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; Mengelberg & Siegert, 2003). Here it is used
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to mean the competencies (or abilities) an individual must possess in order to interact
appropriately with others in a range of social situations. Arguably, however, this still
entails a significant and wide-ranging number of skills or abilities that have attracted
a large amount of research and cannot be fully explored within the constraints of the
present study. Therefore, the concept of social cognition will be outlined briefly
before going on to discuss in more detail the ability to understand the thoughts and
feelings of others. This latter concept is commonly referred to as Theory of Mind
and is the main construct under investigation in the present study.
1.4.1 Social Cognition
The skills involved in social cognition include insight into one's own thoughts and
behaviour. As previously outlined in section 1.2.5, a reduction of insight or self-
awareness is a common consequence of brain injury, which can affect an individual's
ability to evaluate and judge his or her actions. Good social judgement not only
depends upon the capacity for awareness of self, it also relies on being able to have
an awareness of others. These skills, in combination, allow an individual to
accommodate feedback given by the social and physical environment and adjust his
or her behaviour accordingly (Channon & Crawford, 2000). Wood (2001) points out
that many of the social problems experienced by brain injured people occur because
of these kinds of difficulties. He describes this more specifically as a form of social
inattentiveness in that brain injured individuals do not appear to perceive relevant
social cues.
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An example of reduced awareness of self and others was demonstrated by a patient
described by Prigitano (1991) who had undergone a surgical intervention to remove a
right frontal tumour. Following this, the patient was reported by his spouse to have
frequent difficulties in recognising when he had upset others. Another example of
this kind of tactless social behaviour was described previously in the case of Phineus
Gage. His case is also in keeping with findings from more recent studies of brain
injured individuals, which indicate that orbitoffontal damage can result in relatively
preserved cognition, but pronounced disturbance in social cognition of understanding
subtle social and emotional cues (Cicerone & Tranerbaum, 1997).
According to Stuss and Levine (2002), the concept of self-awareness implies a
metacognitive representation of one's own mental states, beliefs, attitudes and
experiences. These authors also highlight that this self-reflecting ability is the basis
for understanding the relationship of one's own thoughts and external events, and to
understanding the mental states of others. The construct of empathy is also
conceivably linked to the successful understanding of others and successful social
functioning in the respect that it also requires the ability to differentiate between the
self and others (Visser-Kaiser et al., 2002). This may account for why some brain
injured individuals also display deficits in their ability to empathise with others. An
investigation conducted by Grattan and Eslinger (1989) into alterations of empathy
following stroke suggested this is a common problem with up to 56% of the patients
in their sample generating empathy scores more than two standard deviations below
the mean.
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In a recent review conducted by Eslinger, Parkinson, & Shamey (2002), impairments
in empathy were associated with lesions in either the left or right prefrontal cortex. In
addition, they also reported that a lesion in the posterior cortical areas can result in
reduced empathy, but only when localised to the right hemisphere. However, they
concluded that impairments in understanding the mental states of others (i.e. Theory
of Mind) may account for some of the empathic alterations demonstrated by right
posterior stroke patients.
Another skill that has been linked to social cognition and, in turn, successful social
functioning is the perception of emotions. This is primarily because assessing
emotional and motivational states is critical to understanding the intentions of others,
with faces, in particular, providing critical information about the emotional states of
others (Norris, et al., 2004). Emotional processing (e.g. perception) is defined by
Zgaljardic, Borod, and Sliwinski (2002) as the ability to perceive, express, and
experience emotions across multiple channels of communication (e.g. facial,
prosodic, and lexical/verbal). In a study conducted by Borod et al., (1998) right
hemisphere damage was found to have a greater effect on emotional perception and
expression than left hemisphere damage. However, in a recent review of emotional
perception and expression following brain damage, Gainotti, Caltagirone and
Zoccolotti (1993) suggest that right hemisphere damage is more likely to disrupt the
autonomic components of an individual's emotional response than the ability to
comprehend or express emotions. Damage to the right posterior cortices has been
associated with the inaccurate perception of emotional facial expressions (Adolphs,
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1996).
27
It has so far been described how deficits in self-awareness, reduced ability to
empathise and impaired perception of emotions are common consequences of brain
injury, particularly to the right hemisphere and frontal cortices. Although research
has tended to focus on individuals with traumatic brain injury, more recent studies
have investigated these social cognition deficits amongst stroke survivors who
appear to display many of the same difficulties. It is also clear how these difficulties
can lead to disrupted interpersonal relationships, decreased social contact and
ultimately to a reduced quality of life. Social interaction difficulties have also been
found to impede rehabilitation progress. Consequently, Carota et al., (2002)
advocate the inclusion of social-related measures when assessing rehabilitation
progress and overall outcome following stroke.
1.5 Theory of Mind
Another aspect of social cognition that is often viewed as inherent to successful
social functioning is the concept of 'theory of mind'. The term theory of mind
(ToM) was originally coined by Premack and Woodruff (1978) in an attempt to
explain their findings that chimpanzees could successfully solve tasks that were
dependent on realising another individual's intentions. In defining this ability, they
proposed that an individual can be considered to possess a ToM if capable of
imputing mental states to himself and others. Premack and Woodruff (1978)
elaborated on this succinct definition by adding that a system of inference of this
kind is properly viewed as a theory, firstly, because such states are not directly
observable, and secondly, because the system can be used to make predictions about
the behaviour of other organisms. Premack and Woodruff (1978) concluded that
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there was evidence to suggest that the chimpanzees in their experiments possessed a
ToM, and that this ability was therefore not particularly sophisticated in nature but
essentially primitive.
This controversial idea of innateness is also supported by human studies of
developmental disorders, in which deficits in ToM are thought to be implicated
(Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992), and by functional imaging studies
(Fletcher et al., 1995). However, Premack and Woodruffs (1978) pioneering study
has been criticised in that its findings could just have easily been interpreted as
displays of rule-based behaviour, which in turn, would not involve a ToM at all
(Byrne, 1996). Since Premack and Woodruffs initial experiments, many researchers
have been motivated to re-evaluate what constitutes ToM, and to further pursue an
adequate explanation of its developmental course in humans. This has resulted in
ToM abilities being explored extensively both with children (Mitchell, 1997;
Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and adults (Bosacki & Astington, 1999; Baron-Cohen et
al., 1997; Blair, Sellars, Strickland et al., 1996; Happe et al., 1998; Kinderman,
Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998).
If one looks to the developmental literature, it appears that the emergence of ToM is
graded, although the exact age at which a child is credited with possessing a ToM
continues to be debated (De Gelder, 1987; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Leslie, 1987;
Chandler, Fritz & Hala, 1989), and seems to vary according to which form of ToM
task is used. However, the dominant view is that during normal development ToM
ability emerges around four years of age (Flavell, 1999). From a social perspective,
there have also been some interesting studies conducted looking at the contribution
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social experience makes to the understanding of others' mental states. In a study
conducted by Happe et al. (1998) investigating the ToM abilities of younger and
older adults, older adults were found to perform significantly better than younger
adults on ToM tasks. Despite some deterioration being observed in other aspects of
cognitive functioning in the elderly, these authors concluded that not only does ToM
ability remain intact, but may even improve with age. However, other studies have
failed to replicate these findings (Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; Maylor, Moulson,
Muncer & Taylor, 2002) although the idea of engaging in wide and varied social
interactions (i.e. repeated practice) as an aid to social competence as a whole is
supported by child studies (e.g. Perner, Ruffman & Leekham, 1994; Ruffman,
Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998).
In an attempt to increase understanding of normal development of ToM, researchers
have turned their attentions to cases where ToM ability appears to be lacking. For
example, Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985) argue that deficits in ToM can account
for the psychosocial deficits regularly observed in autistic individuals. Autism is
characterised by a distinctive triad of impairments in social, communicative and
imaginative activities and, as a result, autistic individuals have a tendency to be self-
involved and indifferent to others. In particular, they do not seem to take account of
other people's feelings or intentions. Individuals with autism and Asperger's
syndrome (AS) have consistently been shown to perform poorly on ToM tasks in the
absence of impairments in general intelligence, which has led to the belief that ToM
deficits are the primary cause. These findings, together with the social interaction
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difficulties displayed by individuals with autism, also imply that an understanding of
other people's minds is vital for social and emotional understanding.
1.5.1 Theory of Mind and the Brain
As outlined above, the ToM hypothesis postulates that there is a developmental
deficit in ToM abilities in autism, but similarities have been noted between the
behaviour of autistic children and adults who have suffered damage to the frontal
lobes. This would suggest two things. Firstly, that the frontal lobes play a
significant role in ToM and, secondly, that ToM ability can be 'knocked out' or
impaired as a result of acquired brain injury. Indeed, patients with damage that
includes both orbital and medial frontal cortex have been shown to have severe
deficits in social functioning (Baron-Cohen, Ring, Moriarty et al., 1994; Damasio,
Tranel, & Damasio, 1990). Several attempts have been made to delineate the brain
regions involved in ToM and there is now growing evidence to further support both
of these ideas in studies using normal and brain injured participants.
Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated activation in the frontal lobes (Fletcher et
al., 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1994), as well as more posterior regions, such as the
temporo-parietal junction, when neurologically intact adults perform ToM tasks
(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Although brain-imaging was not undertaken, findings
from a study conducted by Apperly and colleagues investigating ToM ability in
brain-injured patients also suggests prefrontal and temporo-parietal regions play a
role in ToM ability (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino & Humphreys, 2004). However,
each used different kinds of ToM tasks, and it is therefore difficult to draw any firm
conclusions from these studies. Additionally, in isolation, neuroimaging data do not
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show whether particular regions are necessary for ToM reasoning, nor do they
provide direct evidence about the functions of these areas in solving these tasks.
Indeed, it has been argued that evidence from studies of brain-damaged individuals is
vital to understanding Brain-ToM relationships (Bird, Castelli, Malik et al., 2004).
Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger et al. (2003) investigated empathic and theory of
mind abilities in patients with ventromedial (n = 12) and dorsolateral (n = 7) frontal
lobe damage. In the theory ofmind component of this study, the authors included an
assessment of 'faux pas'. Faux pas is believed to be a developmentally more
sophisticated test of theory of mind and involves the representation of two mental
states. The authors also argue that it incorporates both the cognitive and affective
components of ToM (i.e. understanding that someone should not have said
something and also that the person hearing it may feel upset or offended). Shamay-
Tsoory et al. (2003) reported that patients with frontal lobe damage made
significantly more errors than patients with posterior lesions or healthy controls.
However, this study has been criticised by Bird et al. (2004) who highlight there
were no significant difference in the number of errors made by the ventromedial
lesioned group and the seven patients with dorsolateral frontal lobe lesions. In
addition, detailed anatomical data regarding the critical lesions that impaired
performance on the Faux Pas task were not reported. However, a detailed analysis of
lesion sites associated with empathy deficits was performed, suggesting the right
ventromedial frontal lobe as being particularly important in ability to empathise.
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A study was conducted by Stuss, Gallup and Alexander (2001) in order to verify
whether the frontal lobes are uniquely related to ToM, and if distinct regions,
particularly in the right hemisphere, contribute to different processes related to ToM.
In doing so, Stuss and colleagues investigated visual perspective taking and ability to
detect deception in a sample (n = 32) of individuals with lesions in the right and left
frontal and non-frontal areas of the brain. In the perspective-taking task, individuals
had to infer the visual experience of others, whereas in the deception tasks, they had
to be able to infer when somebody was trying to deceive. The findings of this study
revealed that lesions throughout the frontal lobe were associated with impaired
perspective-taking, with some suggestion of a more important role for the right
frontal lobe. This fits with research that shows the right hemisphere as having a
central role in the neural network for social cognition. However, the sample included
individuals with different aetiologies (stroke, traumatic brain injury, lobectomy and
tumour) and the number of each type of brain injury was not reported. Therefore,
these findings only provide preliminary evidence for the role of the right frontal lobe
in ToM ability.
Happe, Malhi, and Checkley (2001) reported on a case of a 76 year old man who had
undergone surgical intervention targeting the neuronal connections between limbic
thalamic nuclei and orbito-frontal cortex as a treatment for bipolar affective disorder.
They investigated his ToM ability using story and cartoon materials requiring mental
state attributions. Happe and colleagues reported that this gentleman was impaired
on all ToM tasks, but performed within normal limits on control tasks. They
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concluded disconnection of frontal and limbic regions can impair previously
acquired ToM.
It has been outlined (see section 1.4) that successful social functioning is the
outcome of a complex array of interacting cognitive, behavioural and affective
competencies, although the ability to behave appropriately within a social context
intuitively indicates an aptitude in understanding what other people may be thinking
or feeling (e.g. theory of mind). Although not conclusive, the studies outlined above
suggest several brain regions as being implicated in theory of mind, particularly the
frontal lobes and the right hemisphere. Other studies have reported impairments in
right hemisphere damaged patients on a range of other social reasoning tasks
including comprehension of similes, metaphors, proverbs, sarcasm and humour
(Brownwell, Simpson, Bihrle, Potter, & Gardner, 1990). However, the brain injury
studies that have so far been outlined used samples with mixed aetiologies and are
therefore in no way conclusive. They are also hampered by the differing
methodologies.
1.5.2 Theory of Mind and Stroke
As outlined in sections 1.5 and 1.5.1, theory of mind ability has been extensively
studied in children, individuals with autism and neurologically healthy adults. More
recently, the ToM concept has also been explored in schizophrenia (Mazza, De Riso,
Surian et al., 2001) and degenerative neurological conditions, such as dementia
(Cuerva, Sabe, Kuzis at. al., 2001; Gregory, Lough, Stone et al., 2002; Lough,
Gregory, & Hodges, 2001), and Parkinson's disease (Mengelberg & Siegert, 2003).
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The ToM studies outlined in section 1.5.1 involved individuals with acquired brain
injury, and most included individuals with varying aetiologies, such as traumatic
brain injury and surgical intervention for tumour amongst others. However, there
appears to be a paucity of studies that have investigated survivors of stroke (amongst
other aetiologies) and, to the author's knowledge, only 3 studies to date have
investigated the ToM ability specifically following stroke (Stone, Baron-Cohen &
Knight, 1998; Happe, Brownell & Winner, 1999; Bird et al., 2004).
In the first of these studies, Stone et ah, (1998) undertook to test a series of
developmentally graded theory of mind tasks in frontal lobe patients to determine if
any subtle ToM deficits could be detected. They tested patients with damage to the
orbitofrontal cortex because they have been shown to have deficits in social
behaviour. Participants included 5 patients (3 with aphasia) (age range 64-80) with
unilateral lesions to the left dorsofrontal cortex (DFC) resulting from middle cerebral
artery infarcts and 5 patients (age range 34-51) with bilateral damage to the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) from traumatic brain trauma. They also included 5 non-
brain-damaged controls matched for age and years of education. Three ToM tasks
were used (first order and second order false belief, and faux pas) and working
memory demands were controlled for. Stone and colleagues reported that the
sample of stroke patients (DFC damage) were intact when detecting a faux pas in
stories and had difficulty only on versions of the tasks that placed demands on
working memory, whereas the traumatic brain-injured sample with more extensive
bilateral lesions involving orbitofrontal cortex showed difficulties in detecting faux
pas. Both groups were able to perform first and second-order false belief tasks,
providing the memory demands of these were low. They concluded that the OFC is
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part of a ToM circuit involved in ToM tasks with an affective component (faux pas),
and that the DFC cortex is not crucial to the ToM circuit. However, this study did
not investigate the anterior/posterior dimension, non-frontal lesions were not
included, nor did it include patients with unilateral right frontal damage. It is also
likely that diffuse axonal damage was present in the traumatic brain-injured group.
This type of injury is common amongst brain trauma patients and is often not
apparent on brain scans.
Happe, Brownwell and Winner (1999) used the 'strange stories' paradigm developed
by Happe (1994) to investigate acquired deficits in ToM in individuals who had
sustained lesions to the right hemisphere following stroke. Individuals with right
hemisphere damage are known to show pragmatic and social difficulties.
Participants included 14 individuals with right hemisphere damage (RHD) (5 males,
9 females) with an age range from 51 to 75 (mean age 64 years). Eight participants
in this group were between 7 and 23 years (mean 10 years) post stroke. The
additional six participants in the RHD group had suffered more recent strokes and
were between 4 and 9 months (mean 5 months) post stroke. Five participants (4
males, 1 female) who had suffered left hemisphere lesions were also included. The
age range for this group was between 54 and 80 (mean age 67years) and the range of
time since stroke was 12 months to 21 years (mean 9 years). All the patients in the
LHD group were aphasic. The control group comprised of 19 healthy individuals (9
males, 10 females) aged between 61 and 80 (mean age 73).
Happe et al's (1999) study included two parts. In the first, the task used involved 16
short stories of two types (ToM stories and non-mental state stories). The ToM
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stories concerned double bluff, mistakes, persuasion and white lies. Following each
story, participants were required to make inferences about the characters' thoughts
and feelings and also to make an inference about the intentions of the protagonist in
the story. Control stories also involved people, but inferences concerned physical
aspects of the story. In the second part of the study 12 humorous cartoons were used
(6 ToM and 6 non-mental state cartons). In the ToM condition, the humour in the
cartoons was dependent upon what a character mistakenly thought (false belief) or
did not know (ignorance). The non-mental cartoons involved a physical anomaly or
a violation of a social norm.
The performance of RHD patients on each of these tasks was compared to the
performance of LHD patients and controls. The RHD patients' understanding of
materials requiring attribution of mental states was reported as being significantly
worse than their understanding of non-mental control materials. They were also
found to be significantly more impaired on both theory ofmind tasks when compared
to LHD patients and controls. These authors also argued that this deficit was shown
not to be a function of task difficulty.
These findings were perhaps not unexpected given the large amount of evidence
implicating right hemisphere damage in impairments of social awareness and
behaviour. However, the anterior-posterior dimension was not explored in this
study, therefore it is difficult to conclude whether anterior or posterior regions of the
brain played a role in performance on ToM tasks. The story tasks were modified for
the LHD group due to aphasia with a forced-choice answer format being used. Thus,
it could be argued that this modification reduced the difficulty and comparability of
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the task (see Channon & Crawford, 2000). Further criticisms of this study include
the fact that premorbid ability was not fully explored and there was a considerable
range in time since stroke (e.g. from 12 months to 21 years). Therefore, although
individuals with right sided lesions were shown to demonstrate impaired ToM
functioning following stroke, conclusions should be viewed tentatively. Further
investigation would be required in order to clarify whether the source of the deficit
was indeed located in the right hemisphere, or whether there is some other account.
For example, as previously outlined in section 1.5.1, children and adults with
Asperger's syndrome perform poorly on these types of tests (Baron-Cohen et al,
1997), and activation of the medial frontal cortex has been demonstrated in imaging
experiments when ToM stories have been used with healthy individuals (Fletcher et
al., 1995).
The previous two studies involved groups of patients; however, the impact of stroke
on ToM ability has also been described in a single case study (Bird et al., 2004).
Bird and colleagues reported on a 62 year old female who suffered an exceptionally
rare form of stroke - bilateral anterior cerebral artery infarction. Neuroimaging
investigations revealed extensive damage to the medial frontal lobes bilaterally,
including regions identified to be critical for ToM by functional neuroimaging of
healthy participants. These investigators carried out a range of tests including tests
of language, perception, memory, executive function, intellectual functioning, and a
battery of ToM and social cognition tests. The patient was reported as showing
evidence of a dysexecutive syndrome characterised by impairments in planning and
prospective memory. She also had a tendency to confabulate. However, Bird et al.
(2004) also reported that the patient did not demonstrate any significant impairment
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on tasks assessing her ability to construct a ToM when compared to the performances
of 12 age and IQ matched controls. These included a picture sequencing task that
requires understanding of the characters' mental states, Happe's (1994) ToM task, as
outlined above, and a test of faux pas. These authors concluded that the patient's
performance is suggestive of no difficulty in understanding complex social
interactions requiring the representation of mental states, and that the extensive
medial frontal regions destroyed by her stroke are not necessary for this function.
However, the patient was reported as demonstrating a mild insensitivity to
embarrassing situations and a slight blunting of empathy for other people. Therefore,
Bird et al conceded that a more tentative conclusion would be that these findings
suggest that regions of the medial frontal lobes damaged in this patient are not
necessary for at least the cognitive aspects of ToM.
1.5.3 Theory of Mind and Executive Function
Throughout the literature there have been frequent claims that theory of mind (ToM)
is mediated by general executive functioning and, consequently, that poor
performance on ToM type tasks should not necessarily be interpreted as indicative of
poor ability in this area of social cognition (Carlson, Moses & Breton, 2002). As
outlined in section 1.3, executive functioning is believed not to be responsible for
basic cognitive processes but for the set of behavioural competencies that integrate
these capacities. Therefore, it is possible that impairments in executive functions
such as self-awareness and monitoring of behaviour, response inhibition, planning
and decision-making may interfere with both social and non-social functioning.
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Evidence comes from a number of sources to support the suggestion that executive
functions mediate ToM performance, but are not conclusive.
Firstly, recent studies have found that ToM and executive function abilities are
correlated in pre-school children (Frye et al, 1995) and additionally, that executive
function performance predicts ToM performance, but not vice versa (Frye et al.,
1995). The tests often used with children have also been extensively criticised and
have been suggested as measuring something other than ToM, such as working
memory capacity (Davis & Pratt, 1995), or executive function (Zaitchik, 1990;
Hughes & Russell, 1993). Indeed, in a recent study by Carlson and colleagues
(2002), varying executive function demands in ToM tasks was found to increase or
decrease performance in predictable ways. These authors also suggested that a
combination of inhibition and working memory may be fundamental to the
relationship between executive function and ToM.
There is also debate in the autism literature about the specific relationship between
ToM and executive functions, and the extent to which these constructs represent
separable independent processes. Executive dysfunction has also been reported in
studies of autistic individuals, in addition to poor performance on ToM tasks
(Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988; Leslie and Thais, 1992). Similarly, a study conducted
by Ozonoff and colleagues (1991) found a correlation between performance on
executive function and ToM tasks in individuals with autism, but not in healthy
control participants. Thus, it has been suggested that the difficulty autistic
individuals have on ToM tests is at least partly attributable to their lack of executive
control. Similarly, in a recent review of the literature, Pemer and Lang (2000)
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highlighted that the association between ToM and executive function performance is
found even when theory ofmind explanation tasks that have a low executive function
component are used.
Fine et ah, (2001) highlight that most tests used to assess aspects of cognitive
function are not pure; they inherently assess other aspects of functioning. It stands to
reason then that ToM tasks may not be pure ToM tasks, but may also involve an
executive function component amongst others. Therefore, it could be asserted that
correlations between performance on tests of executive function and ToM tasks
should be expected. However, another explanation for the associations found may be
that regions of the brain that mediate ToM and executive functions are anatomically
close to each other (Fine et al., 2001).
Theory of mind deficits may be correlated with executive functioning due to the
involvement of the frontal lobes. Comparisons of anterior-posterior damage have
argued for a specific role of the frontal lobes in executive functions (Reitan &
Wolfson, 1994) and both sets of skills appear to be subserved by a common brain
region (the PFC) in adults (Fletcher et ah, 1995; Goel et ah, 1995; Stuss & Levine,
2002). Previous research by Bach, Davies and Colvin et ah (1998) of a single case
with bilateral frontal damage also suggested that prefrontal damage may be
associated with ToM and executive impairment.
This hypothesis was investigated by Channon and Crawford (2000) in a study
investigating participants with unilateral anterior and posterior lesions. Both these
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brain-injured groups were compared to a healthy group of individuals on a theory of
mind-type task that involved explaining the words and actions of story characters in a
series of brief vignettes. Participants also carried out a set of non-social
neuropsychological tests to permit examination of the relationship between executive
dysfunction and performance on a theory of mind-type task. The results showed that
those with left anterior brain lesions (n = 6, mean age, 40.83) showed impairment
relative to those with right anterior (n=13, mean age, 44.85), left (n=4, mean age,
48.25) and right posterior lesions (n=8, mean age, 43.00) and healthy participants
(n=60, mean age, 43.13) in story comprehension. The other lesion groups did not
differ significantly from the healthy group on any story comprehension measures.
The left anterior lesion participants also showed impairment on some measures of
executive function, but not all.
These authors concluded that in their study, impaired executive function provided a
sufficient explanation of impaired story comprehension performance, without
needing to invoke the concept of an additional theory ofmind impairment. However,
because of the need for adequate language processing to complete the tasks, there
were more right-sided than left-sided lesion patients in the study. Patients were
excluded if they had expressive or receptive aphasia. The nature of some of the
errors made by the left anterior group, such as merely repeating some of the
information already given in the story outlined to them, raises the possibility that
these participants perhaps did not understand what was required of them. It is also
possible, given lesions were in the left frontal region of the brain, that this group of
individuals had undetected language impairment. An alternative explanation that
Channon and Crawford (2002) highlight is the possibility of impairments in both
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domains arising from damage to critical brain areas affecting both sets of processes.
It seems reasonable therefore to hypothesise that damage to the frontal lobes can
result in a reduced ability to understand the mental states of others. The consequence
of this would be poor social functioning.
Despite the above evidence that suggests ToM deficits can be understood as
impairments in executive function, there is also evidence that suggests these abilities
are independent. Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, and Morris (2001) investigated the
relationship between ToM ability and executive functioning in 31 patients with
unilateral lesions of the frontal lobes (prefrontal lesions) (15 right-sided and 16 left-
sided) and 31 healthy controls using first and second order false belief tests. Their
findings showed that patients with left frontal and right frontal lesions were equally
and significantly more impaired on ToM tasks than controls. Both frontal lobe
groups also exhibited a range of deficits on tests of executive functions, which the
authors reported as being independent of ToM. However, almost half of the patients
had received surgical treatment for intractable epilepsy, and it is widely accepted that
longstanding epilepsy may be associated with atypical cerebral organisation of
cognitive functions. Therefore it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the
true nature of ToM and executive function from these findings. However,
independence ofToM ability from executive function is supported by other studies.
Bach, Happe, Fleminger and Powell (2000) investigated ToM ability (stories and
cartoons), its relation to executive functioning, and the role of the frontal cortex in a
59 year old adult male with extensive damage to the orbitofrontal cortex and
43
disturbance in social behaviour resulting from closed head injury. This patient
completed assessments on admission, and at 6 and 12 month follow-up. He was
found to perform as well as elderly control participants (mean age 73) on Happe et
al.'s (1994) strange story task, but displayed some difficulty with understanding
humour in the tasks involving cartoons. This patient was also reported as having
significant difficulties on tasks of executive function, particularly in relation to self-
monitoring, response to feedback, and with initiating tasks. He did not, however,
show a global impairment in executive functioning, displaying an ability to problem
solve within a concrete context and demonstrated flexibility of thinking. Bach and
colleagues (2000) concluded their findings suggest that executive ability is not a
necessary component of the cognitive processes underlying ToM ability. However,
the authors conceded that their ToM task may not have been significantly complex
enough to necessitate orbitofrontal involvement. There are also difficulties in
comparing this gentleman's performance to that of a group of adults who were
considerably older.
It is difficult to generalise the findings from a single case study to the wider brain
injured population especially when the opposite pattern of dissociation has also been
reported. For example, Happe, Malhi & Checkley (2001) studied a patient with
frontal lobe damage following surgical intervention. This patient was found to be
severely impaired in his ability to represent mental states, but showed no indication
of executive function impairment. Happe et al. (2001) therefore concluded that
failures on ToM tasks are not simply a function of executive dysfunction. There
have also been recent suggestions that the amygdala may be involved in the
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development of the circuitry mediating ToM (Fine et al., 2001). As outlined
previously, the amygdala has interconnections with regions of the prefrontal cortex,
and both these areas have been implicated in the circuitry that mediates ToM
(Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel,et al., 1995).
As alluded to above, studies with both children and adults have produced conflicting
results about the lateralisation of ToM function (e.g. Channon & Crawford, 2000;
Happe, Brownell & Winner, 1999; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998) and/or
whether the frontal lobes (or executive functions) are necessary (e.g. Bird, Castelli,
Malik, Frith & Husain, 2004; Fine, Lumsden, & Blair, 2001). It seems possible that
this pattern of findings is the result of difficulty in finding appropriate tasks for
testing ToM and more likely due to the fact that different studies have used different
types ofToM tasks. There are also difficulties in relation to the executive tasks used
in these studies. Executive function refers to a wide range of abilities (see section
1.3) and different aspects of executive function have been shown to be dissociable
(Burgess & Shallice, 1997). Individuals may perform well on one type of executive
function task and not on another. Therefore, which aspect of executive function is
being tapped is dependent on the type of measure used. Nonetheless, it seems that
some aspect of executive function is necessary (if not sufficient) for successful
performance on ToM tasks.
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1.6 Summary
Incidence rates suggest stroke as being relatively common amongst the general
population and the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (2002) report stroke
as being the most frequent cause of severe disability in the United Kingdom.
The consequences and rate of recovery from stroke can vary significantly among
individuals depending on the location and extent of lesion amongst other factors.
However, in addition to motor dysfunction, changes in affect and cognitive and
emotional deficits are frequently associated with stroke and have been shown to
impact on recovery rates and rehabilitation outcomes. In particular, cognitive and
emotional impairments constitute one of the major obstacles to recovery and to
achieving maximal quality of life following stroke. They can also disrupt processes
central to social interaction and, in turn, can affect psychosocial functioning.
(Hochstenbach, Mulder, van Limbeek et al., 1998; Rasquin, Verhey, Lousberg et al.,
2002; Stephens, Kenny, Rowan et al., 2004; Elinger, Parkinson & Shamay, 2002;
Bogousslavsky, 2003; Eslinger et al., 2002).
Within the realm of social cognition, brain injury research has increasingly focussed
on a specific element of social competence: the ability to attribute mental states (e.g
thoughts, feelings, desires, and beliefs) in order to explain and predict people's
behaviour. This ability is termed Theory of Mind (ToM) (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985),
and normally develops in the pre-school years. It has been suggested that the
development ofToM rests on an innately predisposed, cognitive mechanism, or more
conservatively, a neural network (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). This controversial idea
of innateness is supported by human studies of developmental disorders, in which
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deficits in ToM are thought to be implicated (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leslie & Thaiss,
1992), and by functional imaging studies (Fletcher et al., 1995). It follows then, in
theory, that this mechanism or neural network could be damaged following acquired
brain damage in adulthood, resulting in acquired impairments in ToM.
It has been argued that the frontal lobes are necessary for ToM (Shamay-Tsoory,
Tomer, Berger et al., 2003; Stuss et al, 2001), and that the frontal cortex mediates
executive functioning (Dela Salla et al, 1998). Therefore, it seems reasonable to
predict that if an individual has deficits in ToM they might also show deficits in
executive functioning. However, these abilities have been shown to be dissociable
from one another in adults with frontal lobe lesions (Rowe et al, 2001; Bach et al.,
2000; Happe et al., 2001) and studies with both children and adults have produced
conflicting results about the lateralisation of ToM function (e.g. Channon &
Crawford, 2000; Happe, et al., 1999; Stone et al., 1998) and/or whether the frontal
lobes (or executive functions) are necessary (e.g. Bird et al., 2004; Fine et al., 2001).
Regions of the frontal cortex have been shown to have multiple reciprocal
connections with subcortical structures and individuals with damage to these areas
have also been found to display difficulties similar to those seen in individuals with
specific frontal lobe lesions and to have deficits in ToM (Happe et al., 2001).
Additionally, there is a large amount of evidence implicating right hemisphere
damage in impairments of social awareness and behaviour (Stuss et al., 2001, Happe
et al., 1999). Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that many regions of the
brain may be involved in ToM ability, with the frontal lobes and right hemisphere
perhaps having particular importance. In relation to the executive function/ToM
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debate, the literature appears to suggest that some aspects of executive function are
necessary, yet not sufficient, for successful performance on ToM tasks. In other
words, executive functioning deficits are not solely responsible for poor performance
on ToM tasks and that these abilities are in some ways mutually exclusive.
1.7 Present Study - Aims and Hypotheses
To date, only one published group study has looked at acquired ToM deficits
following right hemisphere stroke (Happe et al, 1999). These authors found that
patients who had suffered a right hemisphere stroke, a group known to show
pragmatic and social difficulties, performed significantly worse on ToM tasks
compared to left hemisphere damaged patients and healthy controls. However,
Happe and colleagues (1999) did not investigate whether executive functioning
deficits could have been a contributory factor to these findings, nor did they
investigate the anterior/posterior dimension of brain lesion localisation, (see section
1.4.2 for additional criticisms of this study).
1.7.1 Aims
In view of the above, the main aim of this study was to extend the work carried out
by Happe and colleagues by further investigating a component of everyday social
understanding commonly referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM) in post-stroke
individuals. A different ToM measure was used in this study for various reasons (see
section 2.3.2), but primarily to allow for the inclusion of individuals with expressive
dysphasia. In addition to the right/left hemisphere division, the anterior/posterior
dimension of brain lesion localisation was also investigated. The second aim was to
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investigate the performance of stroke patients on measures of executive function
compared to controls and, finally, the third aim of this study was to investigate the
relationship between ToM ability and executive functioning in post-stroke
individuals.
This research was considered to be of value because impaired ability to attribute
mental states to others has implications for the individual, progress in therapy (i.e.
rehabilitation), and relevance for relatives, carers and allied professionals.
1.7.2 Hypotheses
Theory of Mind (ToM)
It was hypothesised that:
(i) Individuals with right-sided lesions will perform significantly worse on
the ToM task than either individuals with left-sided lesions or healthy
controls.
(ii) Individuals with anterior lesions will perform significantly worse on the
ToM task than either individuals with posterior lesions or healthy
controls.
(iii) There will be no significant difference in performance on the ToM
Control Task between stroke patient groups and controls.
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Additional research question: Although no specific predictions were made, it was
also planned to investigate whether any specific lesion site (e.g. right anterior or
right posterior) is more detrimental to ToM ability than other lesion locations (e.g
left anterior or left posterior).
Executive Function
It was hypothesised that:
(iv) Both stroke groups (right- and left-sided lesions) will be significantly
impaired on measures of executive function compared to controls.
(v) Individuals with anterior lesions will be more impaired on measures of
executive function compared to individuals with posterior lesions and
controls.
(vi) Patients with right-sided lesions will show less awareness of executive
function deficits compared to patients with left-sided lesions.
(vii) Patients with anterior lesions will show less awareness of executive
function deficits compared to patients with posterior lesions.
Theory of Mind and Executive Function
It was hypothesised that:
(viii) Amongst stroke patients there will be a significant positive relationship
between measures of executive function and ToM.
However,
(ix) Executive function deficits will not fully account for impairments in ToM





This study was of mixed factorial design and involved both within and between
subjects comparisons. The independent variable was group (stroke and control).
The dependent variables were the participants' scores on each of the measures used
in this study, and stroke participants' scores were compared to normative data and to
a control group during analysis. Each participant was seen individually on one
occasion, during which all parts of the assessment battery were administered.
2.2 Participants
During the inclusion period, both rehabilitation wards were always at full capacity
(38 beds) in terms of bed occupancy and 26 stroke patients were admitted to both
rehabilitation wards. Of these, 34 were eligible to take part in the study. All but two
participants approached agreed to take part.
In total, 70 participants took part in this study. The experimental group comprised of
30 individuals (left-sided lesion n = 15, right-sided lesion n = 15) who had received a
diagnosis of stroke and were in-patients of two Stroke Rehabilitation wards at
Woodend Hospital, Aberdeen. Control group participants (n = 40) were recruited via
a local community group (local church). Each participant was asked for their
voluntary co-operation and no incentive was offered for participation.
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2.2.1 inclusion Criteria
To be involved in the study, stroke participants had to meet the following criteria:
• Diagnosis of stroke (within the past 6 months)
• Adults over the age of 18
In addition, only those individuals deemed medically stable by the Consultant
Physician were considered for inclusion in the study.
2.2.2 Exclusion Criteria
Participants were excluded from the study if they met any of the following criteria:
• English was not their first language
• incapable of informed consent
• had a previous or current medical history which is known to affect cognitive
functioning (i.e dementia, significant brain/head injury, substance/alcohol
abuse)
• previous or current history of psychosis
• currently aphasic or suffering from receptive dysphasia
• had visual or hearing impairments that would hinder performance of tasks
2.2.3 Demographic Information
The following information was recorded for both stroke and control participants:
• sex
• age
• years of formal education
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2.2.4 Stroke information
The following information was also gathered retrospectively (after consent had been
given by the participant) from the stroke participants' medical notes:
• type of stroke (Oxford classification, Bamford & Sandercock, 1991)
• location of lesion
• length of time since stroke
2.3 Measures
A total of seven separate measures were used in this study. In addition to an estimate
of pre-morbid functioning, the tests used in this study were believed to measure
'theory ofmind' ability, executive functioning, and mood.
2.3.1 National Adult Reading Test (NART)
Vocabulary is believed to correlate with overall intellectual ability and residual
vocabulary is felt to be the best indicator of pre-morbid mental ability (Lezak,
Howieson & Loring, 2004). With this is mind, The National Adult Reading Test
(NART-2) (Nelson & Willison, 1991) was specifically designed to provide a means
of estimating the pre-morbid intelligence levels of adult patients suspected of
suffering from intellectual deterioration, and to provide a sensitive measure of
previous familiarity with words, rather than a measure of continuing ability to
analyse a complex visual stimulus (Nelson & Willison, 1991). The NART (Nelson
& Willison, 1991) was therefore used in this study as a measure of pre-morbid
intelligence in the stroke participants, and to ensure that individuals in the control
group fell at least within the average range for intelligence.
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The NART (Appendix 1) comprises a list of 50 words printed in order of increasing
difficulty, and they are all 'irregular' or 'atypical' with respect to the common rules
of pronunciation. Therefore, applying the common grapheme-phoneme and stress
rules of the English language would result in incorrect pronunciation, and it has been
argued the words can only be read and pronounced correctly if the subject is familiar
with their written form (Nelson & Willison, 1991).
The NART requires subjects to read the list aloud, and the number of errors made is
recorded. From this reading error score, Revised Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale,
(WAIS-R) verbal, performance, and full-scale IQs can be predicted. A factor
analytic study combining the NART and WAIS-R found the NART error score to
have a high loading on what was identified as verbal intelligence (Crawford, Stewart,
Cochrane, Parker, & Besson, 1989). Crawford and colleagues (1989) conducted
further analyses on the NART and found significant correlations with education (r =
.51), test-retest reliability (r = .98), and inter-rater reliability between .96 and .98. A
significant correlation between NART IQ score and age has also been found (r = -
.18), although accounted for practically none of the variance (Crawford, Stewart,
Garthwaite, et al., 1988). In a recent study of 55 survivors of traumatic brain injury,
performance on the NART was reported as being affected by brain injury severity
and thus may underestimate true premorbid ability (Morris, Lyndsay, Dunn &
Teasdale, 2005). This is an interesting finding because such measures have
previously been viewed as being resistant to most neurological disorders. These
findings were published after data collection for this study had been completed.
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2.3.2 Reading the Mind in the Eves Test (revised version)
The 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste &
Plumb, 2001), or 'Eyes Test' as it is more commonly known, was developed as an
adult measure of Theory of Mind (ToM) ability for use with individuals with
Aperger's syndrome (AS). The version used in this study is a revised version of the
original Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997), with
modifications made by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001) to render it a more
sensitive measure of adult social intelligence (i.e. increasing the number of mental
state choices from 2 to 4). This revised version consists of 37 pictures of black and
white photographs of the eye region of the face (1 practice and 36 test items), which
portray a particular expression or emotion. Participants are required to choose a
word, from a possible four, which they believe best describes what the person in the
picture is thinking or feeling (Appendix 2). Examples of the mental state terms are
words such as fantasising, worried, reflective, preoccupied, amused, etc. It is argued
that successful completion of this task is dependent on an adequate conception of
another's mental states, and an ability to attribute mental states and emotions to
others (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). Because of this, The Eyes Test is argued to
represent the affective component of ToM because it involves basic aspects of
emotion recognition. However, Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001) do point out
that the Eyes Test only involves the first stage of attribution of theory of mind.
Participants only have to identify what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling
(e.g. compassion), as opposed to the second stage: inferring the content of that
mental state (e.g. compassion for her mother's loss). However, they argue that
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attribution of the type ofmental state is part of theory of mind, even if it is not all of
it (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001).
Normative data for the revised Eyes Test was obtained from a study using this task to
examine ToM abilities in a group of individuals with a diagnosis of AS (n = 15) and
among a control group of 'normal' adults (n = 239). Validation analyses revealed the
Eyes Test as successful at differentiating between controls and individuals with AS
based on total scores obtained. These authors also found no significant correlation
between the Eyes Test and IQ (r = .09, p = .6), suggesting that ToM ability is
independent of general (non social) intelligence. However, in a recent study carried
out by Phillips (in preparation), some items of the revised Eyes Test were found to be
unreliable. Therefore, Phillips (in preparation) removed those items which people
were scoring 100 per cent or close to chance on, resulting in a shortened version
comprising 26 items (1 practice, and 25 test items).
There are a number of tests used to assess ToM ability, however many of these were
designed for use with children (e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Zaitchick, 1990) and
therefore unsuitable for use in this study. There are also other ToM measures
developed specifically for use with adults (e.g. Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998;
Happe, Winner, & Brownell, 1998), but after consideration, the modified version of
the Eyes Test described by Phillips (in preparation) was used in this study. As
highlighted above, the Eyes Test was designed to be used with adults with AS.
However, Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) highlight its relevance for clinical groups
beyond those on the autistic spectrum (e.g. acquired brain injury). Consideration
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was also given to the patient group under investigation, and the researcher chose the
Eyes Test because it has less cognitive load, less of a verbal component, and can
therefore be used with patients suffering from expressive dysphasia. Patients can
point to their chosen response. Another reason for choosing this version of the Eyes
Test was the reduced administration time. Fatigue is a common consequence of
stroke, and therefore keeping testing time to a minimum was seen as preferable.
2.3.3 Eves Control Task
Some adult ToM tasks (Kinderman et al, 1998) include a task designed to control for
the possibility of other factors affecting performance, such as memory, and to be
more confident that the psychological construct under investigation is indeed being
measured. Using the same photographs used in the Eyes Test, Baron-Cohen and
colleagues (2001) developed a separate control task for the Eyes Test in which
subjects are asked to judge the sex of the person. Developing this further, Phillips (in
preparation) modified the Eyes Test control task (Appendix 3). Participants are still
required to identify the sex of the person, but in addition, are also asked to identify
the age of the person, from a choice of possible four age range answers. If
participants are performing poorly on this control task, it would call into question
whether they had indeed understood what was required of them in the Eyes Test, or
the possibility that they had visual problems affecting performance. The version
developed by Phillips (in preparation) was used in this study, primarily because it
corresponded with the version of the Eyes Test also used in this study.
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2.3.4 Verbal Fluency (FAS)
Measures of verbal fluency are widely used in neuropsychological assessment, and
have been shown to be especially sensitive to disorders involving the frontal lobes
(Janowsky, Shimamura, Krichevsky, & Squire, 1989; Henry & Crawford, 2004).
The most common verbal fluency task consists of four word-naming trials; three
letters, and one category (Appendix 4). The letter fluency stimuli used in this study
were the letters 'F', 'A', and 'S', and the category fluency cue was 'animals'. In line
with administration instructions, participants were required to say as many words as
they could think of beginning with the given letter of the alphabet, excluding proper
norms, numbers, and the same word with a different suffix. The letter fluency score,
which is the sum of all acceptable words produced in three one minute trials (i.e., one
minute for each letter), was then adjusted for age, sex, and education (Gladsjo,
Miller, & Heaton, 1999). Similarly, in the category fluency trial, participants were
asked to generate as many animals as they could think of, beginning with any letter
of the alphabet. One minute was allowed for this trial. The category fluency raw
score was the total number of animals given, which was also then adjusted for age,
sex and education (Gladsjo et al., 1999).
The normative data used in this study was based on a review of the larger normative
studies (with at least 100 participants) for oral FAS and animal fluency tasks
(Gladsjo et al., 1999). The normative sample, used in the development and
validation of the normative data, consisted of 768 adult volunteers who were enrolled
as normal comparison participants in ongoing research studies of various
neurological and psychiatric disorders at the University of California. Participants
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ranged in age from 20 tolOl years (M = 50.4 years, SD = 19.4). The influence of
demographic variables on letter and category fluency performance was examined in a
sample of 403 individuals. Multiple regression analyses revealed that education, age
and ethnicity accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in both types of
verbal fluency performance. Results of correlational analyses and ANOYAs
demonstrated that the T-score conversions removed all or most demographic biases
from the sample (Gladsjo et al., 1999).
Reduced verbal fluency is argued to reflect impaired mental flexibility and difficulty
shifting set (between letters), which are considered to be important aspects of
executive functioning (Mitrushina, Boon, & D'Elia, 1999; Baldo & Simamura,
1998). Henry and Crawford (2004) carried out a meta-analysis of 31 studies (n =
1791) investigating the sensitivity of verbal fluency to the presence of focal cortical
lesions. They concluded that their findings provided strong support for the validity
of both letter (phonemic) and category (semantic) fluency as executive measures and
indicated that letter fluency is more sensitive to frontal dysfunction than the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) (Heaton, 1993). This task was therefore
included in the assessment battery because executive functioning is one of the
constructs under investigation. Its relatively quick administration was also a
consideration, attempting to keep testing time to a minimum.
2.3.5 The Brixton Test
The Brixton test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) (Appendix 5) is a rule detection and
rule following task designed to assess executive function. In addition to assessing
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the ability to detect and follow a rule, the task also assesses response flexibility to the
changing patterns. This type of test, of which the WCST (Heaton, 1993) is probably
the most well-known example, is known to present problems for patients with frontal
lobe lesions, and failures on such tests are arguably the most commonly reported
dysexecutive sign seen in formal examination (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). It consists
of a 56 page stimulus book: each page showing the same basic array of ten circles set
in two rows of five, with each circle numbered from one to ten. On each page, one
of the circles is filled in with a colour (blue). The position of this filled circle differs
(on most presentations) from page to page. The subject is shown one page at a time
and is asked to consider where the next filled position will be by trying to identify a
pattern, or 'rule', based on what they have seen on previous pages. There are nine
rules in total based on the positions of the coloured circle on preceding cards. For
the simplest rule, the coloured circle advances one position clockwise on successive
cards; a later rule has the circle alternating from position 5 to 10. Differing from the
WCST, subjects are not verbally informed whether there choice is correct or
incorrect. The measure used to calculate scaled scores is the total number of errors
made.
Burgess and Shallice (1996) have shown that there is no one reason for failure on this
task. They identified three broad classes of error: perseveration (i.e. repeating one's
response); the misapplication of a strategy; or guessing or bizarre responses. Burgess
and Shallice found that people with frontal lobe lesions were generally poorer at the
Brixton test than controls and posteriorly-lesioned patients, and also tended to make
significantly more of the last category of error - bizarre or guessing behaviour.
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Standardisation of the Brixton task was based on the performance of 121 controls
(age range 18-80), and 77 patients categorised according to lesion location. The
patient group consisted mainly of individuals with tumours, although the sample did
include 13 individuals suffering from vascular lesions (infarct and haemorrhage).
The split-half reliability of the Brixton Test for the entire control group (n=121) was
found to be quite adequate 0.62 (p<0.001). The overall test re-test reliability for all
subjects was 0.71 (p<0.001), which the test authors argue compares well with that
obtained for a well-established test of general intelligence (Raven's Advanced
Progressive Matrices, set 1, (Raven, 1943). Age and NART IQ were found to be
related to performance, however, there were no significant sex effects (Burgess &
Shallice, 1997). The Brixton Test has also been found to have modest ecological
validity (i.e., it is predictive of everyday behaviour) (Odhuba, van de Broek & Jones,
2005).
Burgess and Shallice (1997) describe the Brixton as a straightforward test, and one
which is more pleasant (and quicker) for the participant to perform than some others,
and which is quick to score and interpret. The test authors also argue that the Brixton
test is better than most other concept attainment tasks because it provides good data
distributions in normal subjects, avoiding range restrictions, and therefore making
test interpretation less problematic. In addition, subjects are able to do this task non-
verbally, thus allowing for the inclusion of individuals with expressive dysphasia.
These were the main considerations for including it in the assessment battery used in
this study.
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2.3.6 Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX): Behavioural Assessment of
the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS)
The Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX) is part of the Behavioural Assessment of the
Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) test battery (Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie,
& Evans, 1996), but can be used independently of the other tests. The DEX is a 20
item symptom checklist designed to measure a range of difficulties commonly
believed to be involved in executive dysfunction, such as abstract thinking problems,
lack of insight and social awareness, distractibility, loss of decision-making ability
and so on. The questionnaire samples four broad areas of likely changes, such as,
emotional and personality changes, motivational changes, behavioural changes, and
cognitive changes, and includes statements such as "I act without thinking, doing the
first thing that comes to mind," and "I find it difficult to keep my mind on something
and am easily distracted". Each item is scored on a 5-point (0-4) Likert scale
(ranging from 'never' to 'very often') and an overall impairment score (maximum
80) is derived from totalling the 20 individual item scores.
There are two forms of the DEX. One is designed to be given to the patient
(Appendix 6) and the other (Appendix 7) to someone who knows the subject well,
which in this study was either the named nurse for the patient, or a member of
therapy staff who worked with the patient regularly. The questions on each are
identical, except for minor changes in phrasing. On occasion during this study, the
DEX was read aloud to the patient, and each item was gone through individually,
allowing adequate time for the individual to consider each question. The higher one
scores, the poorer executive functioning is thought to be. Additionally, by
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comparing the two (self and independent rater), one can compute a difference score
to judge level of insight. The manual reports a significant difference in how patients
rate themselves, and how others rate them; patients, as a group, rate themselves as
having less problems than their significant others are reporting. This is argued to
reflect problems of reduced insight, which is a known and common difficulty
reported in the brain injury literature. The manual reports a significant correlation (-
0.62, p <0.01) between the overall BADS profile score of dysexecutive difficulties
for the patient sample (n = 92), and the others' ratings of these individuals on the
DEX questionnaire of executive functioning.
2.3.7 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-ll)
The revised Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996)
(Appendix 8) is a 21-item self-report depression screening measure and has become
one of the most widely accepted measures for assessing the severity of depression in
diagnosed individuals, and for detecting possible depression in normal populations
(Beck et al., 1996). Depression is known to be a common consequence of stroke,
and can affect cognitive functioning. There is also evidence to suggest that
individuals who are depressed are biased in their judgments of emotions in others
(Leppanen, Milders, Bell, Terriere, & Hietanen, 2004). It was therefore used in this
study as an attempt to control for the possibility of depression affecting performance
on the Eyes Test, which asks participants to identify the thoughts or emotions of
others. Its ease of use was also a consideration.
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The BDI was originally developed for research purposes, but is used extensively in
clinical settings. Each item deals with a particular aspect of the experience and
symptoms of depression (cognitive, affective, and somatic) and invites subjects to
rate their own experience over the preceding two weeks. Each item contains four
statements of graded severity expressing how a person might think or feel about the
aspect of depression under consideration (Lezak et al., 2004). The score is the sum
of all the selected statements with the maximum score being 63. The higher the
overall score the more depressed the patient is likely to be. These criteria are only
guidelines, however, and clinical judgement was also used in deciding whether an
individual was indeed suffering from a depressive disorder.
It was also taken into consideration that the BDI-II, despite revision, has inherent
problems when being used with elderly subjects. As Kaszniak and Allender (1985)
highlight, seven of the 21 items refer to somatic symptoms increasing the possibility
ofmisinterpretations when the patient has physical ailments (e.g. fatigability), as was
the case with many of the stroke participants in this study. Therefore, care was taken
to emphasise to subjects that they were being asked to consider changes in their
experience during the preceding two weeks, and not in relation to how things used to
be prior to having had a stroke. In line with the test manual the BDI was
administered orally on some occasions; the researcher read out loud all statements
from each group of statements, and then read back the statement corresponding to the
number given by the examinee to confirm the statement selected. In
establishing/investigating the psychometric properties of the BDI-II, a total sample of
620 individuals were recruited from 4 psychiatric outpatients clinics and 1 local
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college (age range 13-86) (Beck et al., 1996). The manual reports significant test-
retest correlations of .93 and findings indicative of robust convergent and
discriminant validity (Beck et al., 1996).
2.4 Procedure
2.4.1 Stroke Group
Potential participants were those individuals with a diagnosis of stroke admitted to
two stroke rehabilitation wards at Woodend Hospital, Aberdeen, during the time of
the study. In collaboration with the Consultant Physicians, potential participants
were identified. Using a sheet attached to the front of each patient's medical notes
with a tick box (Yes/No), the Senior House Officer (SHO) or Medical Support Nurse
(MSN) was asked to indicate whether the patient met the inclusion criteria. The
SHO or MSN was then asked to approach the patient to ask if they would be happy
for the principal investigator to speak to them further about the study. During this,
the SHO or MSN briefly outlined the rationale for the study and provided a study
information sheet (Appendix 9). The information sheet, as well as explaining the
purpose of the study, also highlighted issues of consent, confidentiality, and the
voluntary nature of the study. If the individual agreed, the researcher met with them
to fully explain the study and answer any questions. Potential participants were then
given up to one week to consider the information provided, and whether they wished
to take part. Individuals were encouraged to speak to staff, family or friends about
taking part in the study. It was also pointed out that even if they agreed, they could
still withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give an explanation, and
without this affecting their ongoing care and treatment.
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2.4.2 Control Group
Participants in the control group comprised of 40 individuals recruited from a local
community group (local church). Every effort was made to match these individuals
with stroke group participants in terms of sex, age, and years of education. The
inclusion criteria were adults with no reported neurological conditions and the
exclusion criteria were the same as that described for the stroke group participants.
Potential participants were provided with the same information regarding the study
as the stroke patients, although changes were made regarding why they had been
asked to participate, and with regards to what they would be required to do
(Appendix 10).
2.4.3 Administration
All stroke participants were seen individually in a private room to ensure
confidentiality, and to avoid the noise and distractions from the ward environment.
They were all seen on only one occasion, and length of testing time varied between
35 minutes and 65 minutes depending on ability. The measures were administered in
accordance with the relevant manual instructions, although the Eyes Test was
modified slightly by asking the participant to read out loud or point to each of the
four words before making their choice. This was in order to compensate for the
possible presence of visual neglect, which commonly occurs following stroke. The
researcher was then more confident in the results obtained. Similarly, some
individuals in the stroke group suffered from mild expressive dysphasia (n = 7), and
it was therefore not appropriate to administer some of the other tasks, such as the
NART and verbal fluency test. DEX questionnaires (independent rater) were
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completed by either the named nurse or a member of the therapy team, believing
them to have the most contact, and therefore the most reliable views on the patient's
behaviour. The tasks were randomly presented to minimise order effects, although
the NART was always administered after the verbal fluency task. This was to
prevent the possibility of participants using words from the NART to enhance verbal
fluency performance.
All the control participants were seen in their own home for convenience. In the
control group, participants were asked during interview to disclose whether they had
a current or past history of diagnosis or treatment for psychiatric or medical
conditions in order to assess suitability for inclusion in the study. The researcher
asked specifically about mood disorders, and enquired about factors associated with
the risk of stroke (e.g. hypertension, high cholesterol, head injuries etc.).
All measures were administered to control participants, apart from the DEX
questionnaires, which were only administered to those with stroke and their named
nurse or therapist. In addition to verbal consent, written consent was provided by all
participants (Appendix 11)
2.5 Ethical Considerations
A number of ethical issues were considered prior to undertaking this study and great
care was taken to avoid causing distress to any of the participants. Although
participants would not have been considered 'vulnerable' in the formal sense (i.e.
children; individuals with a learning disability; individuals incapable of informed
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consent), the researcher still considered stroke participants, in particular, to be a
vulnerable group. Primarily this was because stroke participants, many of whom
were elderly, were viewed by the investigator as 'recovering from illness'. Issues
such as pain and fatigue, which are common symptoms following stroke, were also
seriously borne in mind
It was also taken into account that, on occasion, neuropsychological assessments can
cause some stress to patients. It was therefore planned to stop testing if this occurred
However, on no occasion did this happen and most participants gave positive
feedback about the experience. Finally, the questionnaires and other measures used
in this study were not thought by the investigator to be of a sensitive, embarrassing
or upsetting nature. However, it was considered possible that individuals could react
in unexpected ways, and become stressed or upset as a result. Thankfully, this
situation did not arise, but testing would have been discontinued if it had.
This study was granted full ethical approval by Grampian Research Ethics
Committee, and registered with the Grampian Research and Development
department (Appendix 12).
2.6 Data Analysis
All statistical analyses were run using the Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences
(SPSS), version 12. Gravetter and Wallnau (1996) outline that in situations where
there is unequal number of participants in each group, as was the case in this study,
ANOVA still provides a valid test when the discrepancy between sample sizes is not
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extreme. In addition, the assumptions for using parametric tests were met, therefore
one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA), and analyses of covariance (ANCOYA)
were run for comparisons. Sheffe's post hoc anlyses were also run. Gravetter and
Wallnau (1996) highlight that this test uses an extremely cautious method for
reducing the risk of Type 1 error and because of this has the distinction of being one
of the safest of all possible post hoc tests. Pearson's product moment correlational
analyses were also conducted in order to determine the associations between the
variables of interest in this study. The effect size of the correlation coefficients is
based upon the definitions provided by Cohen & Holiday (1982):
.00 to .19 is very low
.20 to .39 is low
.40 to .69 is modest
.70 to .89 is high
.90 to 1.00 is very high
2.7 Statistical Power
One-way ANCOVA was carried out using right hemisphere lesion, left hemisphere
lesion, and control as the 3 groups and executive function as covariant. Results of
Happe, Brownell and Winner's (1999) study suggest effect size will be very large
and taking power 0.8 and alpha = .05 groups of size 21 would be required to detect a
statistically significant difference if they are equal (Cohen, 1992). A covariant was
thought unlikely to reduce power, but practical considerations made it necessary to





The main aim of this study was to investigate a component of everyday social
understanding commonly referred to as 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) in post-stroke
individuals. A second aim was to investigate performance of stroke patients on
measures of executive function compared to controls. The third aim of this study
was to investigate the relationship between ToM ability and executive function in
post-stroke individuals. Therefore, total scores for each of the measures in the
battery of tests were computed before analyses were conducted. Scaled or t scores
were also computed for the measures that provided appropriate information to enable
this function to be carried out. Prior to statistical analysis, exploratory data analysis
was conducted which demonstrated that distributions were sufficiently normal for
assumptions of parametric statistics to be met.
3.1 Participants
3.1.1 Group Descriptive Statistics
The experimental group consisted of 30 stroke patients (15 right-sided lesions (male,
n = 7; female, n = 8) and 15 left-sided lesions (male, n = 7; female, n = 8) recruited
from two inpatient stroke rehabilitation wards. The control group comprised 40
individuals (male, n = 18; female, n = 22) recruited from a local community group.
(a) Handedness
Handedness was determined by self-report and all participants were right-handed
with the exception of one male in the control group.
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(b) Sex
Table 1 shows the number of males and females in each of the groups. As this table
demonstrates, relatively equal numbers of males and females were represented in
each of the groups.




SEX male n 18 7 7 32
female n 22 8 8 38
Total N 40 15 15 70
*
Performing a chi-square analysis confirmed there were no significant differences between frequencies of males
and females within each of the groups, x2 (2, n = 70) = .019, p = .990. This confirmed both sexes were relatively
well represented thereby reducing the risk of a sex (gender) bias in performance on Theoiy ofMind tasks.
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(c) Years of Education. Age and NART predicted IQ
Every effort was made to match the stroke and control participants in terms of years
of education, age and IQ (Table 2).








education Mean 11.73 10.87 12.13 11.77
N 15 15 40 70
Std.
3.08 2.26 3.54 3.21
Deviation
Minimum 9 8 8 8
Maximum 19 17 20 20
Age Mean 67.80 67.73 66.62 67.11
N 15 15 40 70
Std.
14.14 9.99 12.74 12.36
Deviation
Minimum 31 50 30 30
Maximum 86 84 86 86
NART
predicted
IQ Mean 105.40 101.38 108.87 107.10
N 15 8 40 63
Std.
Deviation
11.22 12.08 9.47 10.40
Minimum 90 86 89 86
Maximum 127 121 124 127
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Table 2 demonstrates that the control group had slightly more years of education than
both the right-sided lesion group (RSL) and left-sided lesion group (LSL). Similarly,
mean NART predicted IQ was greater in the control group compared to both RSL
group and LSL group. In terms of age, the groups did not appear to differ
significantly. Analyses of variance (ANOVA) indicated no significant differences
between the groups in terms years of education (F(2, 67) = 0.83, p = 0.44 ns), age
(F(2, 67) = 0.07,/? = 0.93 ns), orNART predicted IQ (F(2, 67) = 2.06,/? = 0.14 ns).
(d) Depression
As outlined in Section 2.3.7, depression is known to globally affect cognitive
function, and is a common consequence of stroke. Therefore the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI-II) was used to allow depression to be controlled for. The findings
relating to depression for each of the groups are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the BDI measure of depression.
Group N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
BDI score control 40 4.22 4.05 0 17
right-sided lesion 15 5.20 7.52 0 28
left-sided lesion 15 4.73 4.17 0 18
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory
As Table 3 shows, the right-sided lesion group scored slightly higher on the BDI
compared to the lefit-sided lesion and control groups. However, Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) revealed that the difference between groups was not significant, F(2, 67)
= 0.22 , p = .082 ns. The frequencies of each BDI category are shown in Table 4.









Total 40 15 15 70





It can be seen in Table 4 that the majority (n = 67) of the sample scored within the
minimal range. This classification is given even for those who score zero on the BDI
measure. Two individuals fell within the mild range for depression according to
their BDI score; one in the control group and one in the left-sided lesion group.
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The maximum score of 28 (Table 3) and the corresponding moderate classification of
depression (Table 4) in the right-sided lesion group is representative of an outlier
within the entire sample. This case was not excluded from further analyses as it was
believed to accurately reflect the individual's feelings at the time of testing.
However, this individual, despite scoring within the moderate range for depression
on the BDI, did not present at interview as clinically depressed. Further qualitative
examination of the data for this case supported this view. This individual's
performance on tasks was not globally impaired, and on occasion, their performance
was in line with that of control participants.
3.1.2 Stroke Group Characteristics
(a) Time Since Stroke
Time since stroke information was computed by totalling the number of days that
had passed between date of stroke and date of testing. The mean number of days
since stroke for both the right-sided lesion and left-sided lesion groups is presented in
Table 5. This finding is also shown graphically in Figure 1.
Table 5. Mean number of days since stroke for the right-sided lesion and left-sided
lesion groups
Group
Mean N SI) Minimum Maximum
Right-sided
71.0 15 32.48 34 120
lesion
Left-sided
77.4 15 32.48 40 154
lesion
Total 74.2 30 32.08 34 154
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Figure 1. Boxplots showing the range and median number of days since stroke for
both stroke groups (right-sided lesion, n = 15; left-sided lesion, n = 15).
right-sided lesion left-sided lesion
group
A one-way ANOVA found no statistically significant difference between the two
stroke groups (right-sided lesion (M = 71.00, SD = 32.48, range, 34-120); left-sided
lesion (M= 77.47, SD = 22.48, range, 40-154) in terms of mean time since stroke
(F(l, 28) = 0.30, p - 0.59 ns), therefore, this variable was not included in further
analyses.
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(b) Location of Lesion
Stroke group participants were classified as having sustained either a right-sided
lesion (RSL) or left-sided lesion (LSL) based on the type of stroke (Oxford
Classification, see section 1.1.4 in Introduction section) reported in the medical
notes. The frequencies of each type of stroke are shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Frequencies of Oxford Stroke classifications as a function of side of lesion
and sex of participant.
Oxford Sex
classification Male Female Total
Right TACI 4 1 5
Left TACI 2 2 4
Right PACI 1 5 6
Left PACI 1 2 3
Right LACI 2 2 4
Left LACI 3 3 6
Left HAEM 1 1 2
Total 14 16 30
TACI = Total Anterior Circulation Infarct; PACI = Partial Anterior Circulation Infarct;
LACI = Lacunar Infarct; HAEM = Haemorrhagic stroke.
NB: Haemorrhage is not considered within the Oxford Classification (Bamford &
Sandercock, 1991), but is included in this table for ease of comparisons.
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Following Burgess and Shallice (1996), stroke participants were also classified as
anterior (n = 13) if the lesion involved the frontal lobe, and as posterior (n = 17) if
there was no frontal involvement. Lesion evidence was based on the medical
interpretation of clinical radiological MRI or CT reports and information
documented in patients' medical notes. These findings are shown in table 7.
Table 7. Anterior and Posterior classification for stroke participants.
sex
male female Total
location Anterior 7 6 13
of lesion Posterior 7 10 17
Total 14 16 30
The anterior/posterior distinction was further broken down to include the
hemispheric location of lesion. This information can be seen in Table 8.






















Total 14 16 30
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3.2 Theory of Mind (ToM) Task
3.2.1 Right versus Left-sided lesions
The Eves Test
In accordance with the aim of investigating the differences between the groups on the
Eyes Test, which is believed to measure ToM ability, scores were analysed in terms
of group (right-sided lesion (RSL) n=15, left-sided lesion (LSL) n=15, and control
n=40). It was hypothesised that individuals with RSLs would perform significantly
worse on the Eyes Test than either individuals with LSLs or healthy controls.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 9.
Table 9. Descriptive statistics of performance on the Eyes Test
95% Confidence
Interval for mean





Control 40 16.43 3.37 15.35 17.50 10 24
Right- 15 10.07 4.11 7.79 12.34 5 18
sided lesion
Left-sided 15 15.27 2.99 13.61 16.92 11 23
lesion
Total 70 14.81 4.26 13.80 15.83 5 24
The confidence intervals demonstrate that the left-sided lesion group and the control
group overlap, indicating that there are no important differences between these two
groups' performance on the Eyes Test. The right-sided lesion group, however, not
only has a lower sample mean (M = 10.07, SD = 4.11) of correct ToM judgments
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than both the left-sided lesion group (M = 15.27, SD = 2.99) and controls (M =
16.43, SD = 3.37), but the confidence interval for the mean does not overlap with
them. As expected, this suggests that there is a difference in performance on the Eyes
Test between the right-sided lesion group and both the left-sided lesion group and the
control group.
A one-way ANOVA comparing the three groups on the Eyes Test revealed the
difference between groups was significant, F(2, 67) = 18.50, p < .001. This
represented an effect size (partial t]2) of 0 .356, showing that nearly 36% of the
variation in performance on the Eyes Task can be accounted for by group (i.e.
presence and hemispheric location of lesion).
Further examination using Scheffe's post-hoc tests confirmed that the right-sided
lesion group performed significantly worse than the other two groups (left-sided
lesions and Control), who did not differ significantly from each other (Table 10).
Thus, the hypothesis that individuals with right-sided lesions would perform
significantly worse on The Eyes Test compared to individuals with left-sided lesions
and controls has been supported.
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Table 10. Sheffe's post-hoc analysis comparing right-sided lesion, left-sided lesion
and control groups' performance on the Eyes Test
Mean 95% Confidence Interval











6.358* 1.050 .001 3.73 8.99
Left-sided
lesion





-5.200* 1.266 .001 -8.37 -2.03
*The mean difference is significant at the .01 level.
Eves Control Task
It was hypothesised that no difference would be found between the groups'
performance on the Eyes Control Task. Mean scores for each of the groups'
performance on the Eyes Control Task is shown in Table 11.
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Table 11. Descriptive statistics of performance on the Eyes Control Test for right- and
left-sided stroke and control groups
95% Confidence
Interval for mean





Control 40 24.50 0.85 24.23 24.77 22 25
Right-sided 15 23.87 1.96 22.78 24.95 19 25
lesion
Left-sided 15 24.33 1.35 23.59 25.08 20 25
lesion
Total 70 24.33 1.27 24.03 24.63 19 25
Table 11 demonstrate that performance on the Eyes Control Task did not appear to
differ greatly between the groups as it did on the theory ofmind Eyes Test (see Table
7) with the mean scores for the right-sided lesion group (M = 23.87, SD = 1.96),
being similar to that of the left-sided lesion group (M = 24.33, SD = 1.35) and
controls (M = 24.50, SD = 0.85). The maximum score on this task was 25, therefore,
the findings shown in Table 11 also demonstrate an apparent ceiling effect.
Indeed, ANOVA revealed no significant effect of group on the Eyes Control Task,
F(2, 67) = 1.37,/? = .26 ns, which is the result that was predicted. The differences in
performance between the groups on both the Eyes and Eyes Control Tests can be
seen in Figure 2*
A repeated measures ANOVA was also conducted which revealed a significant effect for group x task
interaction, F (4, 65) = 8.33, p <.001. In order to clarify the significant differences, separate one-way ANOVAs
were run comparing the groups' performances on the ToM Eyes and ToM control tests, these analyses are
reported in the text, p84 - 90.
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Figure 2. Mean scores on the Eyes Test and Eyes Control Task.
□ eyes test





3.2.2 Anterior versus Posterior lesions
Differences between anterior and posterior stroke groups' performance on the Eyes
Test were also examined. It was hypothesised that individuals with anterior
positioned lesions would perform significantly worse on The Eyes Test than either
individuals with posterior lesions or healthy controls. A summary of the descriptive
statistics is displayed in Table 12.
Table 12. Descriptive statistics of performance on the Eyes Test for anterior
and posterior stroke and control groups
95% Confidence
Interval for mean





Control 40 16.42 3.37 15.35 17.50 10 24
Anterior 13 13.00 4.02 10.57 15.43 5 19
lesion
Posterior 17 12.41 4.80 9.95 14.88 5 23
lesion
Total 70 14.81 4.26 13.80 15.83 5 24
Although the anterior stroke group performed slightly better than the posterior stroke
group, both stroke groups' performance was poorer than the control group.
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Analysis of Variance demonstrated a significant difference in scores on the Eyes Test
between anterior stroke, posterior stroke and control groups F(2, 67) = 8.15, p <
.001. This represented an effect size (partial p2) of .196, showing that nearly 20% of
the variation in performance on the Eyes Task can be accounted for by group.
Sheffe's post hoc comparisons were conducted to determine which pairs of group
scores were significantly different (Table 13)
Table 13. Post Hoc comparisons between anterior stroke group, posterior stroke
group and control group on the Eyes Test
Mean 95% Confidence Interval
Difference Std. Lower Upper
(I) group (J) group (I-J) Error Sig. Bound Bound
Control Anterior
lesion
3.42* 1.24 .027 0.33 6.52
Posterior
lesion





0.59 1.43 .919 -2.99 4.16
The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
The results shown in Table 13 indicate that both the anterior and posterior stroke
groups performed significantly worse than the control group on the Eyes Test, but
did not differ significantly from each other. Therefore, the prediction that anterior
lesions would be significantly more detrimental to performance on the theory of
mind task compared to posterior lesions has not been supported.
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Examination of the performance on the Eyes Control task between anterior and
posterior stroke and control groups' was also performed (Table 14). It was
hypothesised that there would be no difference in performance on this control task
between groups.
Table 14. Descriptive statistics of performance on the Eyes Control Test for
anterior and posterior stroke and control groups
Group N Mean SD
Control 40 24.50 0.85
Anterior 13 24.62 1.12
lesion
Posterior 17 23.71 1.93
lesion
Total 70 24.33 1.27
95% Confidence
Interval for mean
Lower Upper Minimum Maximum
bound bound
24.23 24.77 22 25
23.94 25.29 21 25
22.71 24.70 19 25
24.03 24.63 19 25
As the results in Table 14 show, the anterior stroke group performed marginally
better on the Eyes Control Task than the posterior stroke and control groups,
although the control group performed slightly better than the posterior stroke group.
However, these differences were slight, and as predicted Analysis of Variance
demonstrated no significant difference between the groups, F(2, 67) = 2.88,/? = .06
ns.
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3.2.3 Comparisons of Right Anterior. Left Anterior. Right Posterior and
Left Posterior stroke
Exploratory Results
Analyses were also conducted to examine the differences between right anterior, left
anterior, right posterior, left posterior stroke and control groups' performance on the
Eyes Test. This investigation was exploratory to investigate whether any specific
lesion site was more detrimental to theory ofmind (ToM) ability compared to others.
No specific hypotheses were made. A summary of the descriptive statistics is
displayed in Table 15.
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Table 15. Descriptive statistics of performance on the Eyes Test for right





































8 14.62 3.74 11.50 17.75 11 23
Total 70 14.81 4.26 13.80 15.83 5 24
Table 15 demonstrates that there were differences between the mean performances
on the Eyes Test for each of the groups. The left anterior lesion group and the right
and left posterior lesion groups performed less well than the control group.
However, the right anterior lesion group's performance was the poorest compared to
all other groups.
Analysis of Variance demonstrated a significant difference in performance scores on
the Eyes Test between right anterior, left anterior, right posterior, and left posterior
stroke and control groups, F(4, 65) = 9.30, p < .001. This represented an effect size
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(partial p2) of .364, showing that nearly 36% of the variation in performance on the
Eyes Task can be accounted for by group (i.e. presence and hemispheric location of
lesion). Sheffe's post hoc comparisons were conducted to determine which pairs of
group scores were significantly different (Table 16).
Table 16. Post Hoc comparisons between right anterior, left anterior, right posterior,













Control right anterior 6.92* 1.53 .001 2.07 11.78
left anterior 0.42 1.43 .999 -4.12 4.97
right posterior 5.98* 1.29 .001 1.89 10.07
left posterior 1.80 1.35 .778 -2.50 6.10
Right
Anterior left anterior -6.50* 1.95 .003 -12.67 -0.33
right posterior -0.94 1.84 .992 -6.79 4.90
left posterior -5.12 1.89 .132 -11.11 0.86
Left
Anterior right posterior 5.56 1.76 .052 -0.03 11.14
left posterior 1.38 1.81 .965 -4.36 7.11
Left
posterior right posterior 4.18 1.70 .209 -1.21 9.57
* The mean difference is significant at the .01 level.
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The results shown in Table 16 indicate that the performance of the right anterior
group on the Eyes Test differed significantly from that of the left anterior and control
groups. The right posterior group's performance differed significantly from the
controls, but not from the right anterior group. No other significant differences were
found.
Comparison of these groups' performance on the Eyes Control test revealed no
significant differences between the groups F(4, 65) = 1.63 , p = .18 ns. These
findings are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Mean scores on the Eyes Test and Eyes Control Test for the control group
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In accordance with the aim of investigating the differences between the groups on
executive function tasks, scores were analysed in terms of the right/left lesion
dimension and anterior/posterior lesion dimension. More specific comparisons were
not explored. This was due to the fact that post hoc analyses would not have been
possible due to missing data (n = 7) for the left anterior group owing to mild
expressive dysphasia.
Standardised scores (i.e. adjusted for age and education) for The Brixton Task and
Verbal Fluency tasks were used in analyses.
3.3.1 Right versus Left-sided Stroke
It was hypothesised that both stroke groups (right-sided and left-sided lesions) would
be equally impaired on measures of executive function. Descriptive statistics for the
right and left-sided lesion groups' performance on The Brixton Task and letter and
category Verbal Fluency tasks are shown below. Table 17 highlights missing data
for 7 individuals in the left-sided lesion group on tasks of verbal fluency (letter and
category trials). These individuals suffered from mild expressive dysphasia and it
would not have been appropriate to administer these tests given their reliance on
intact verbal ability. The Brixton Task has no verbal demands and was completed by
all participants.
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Table 17. Descriptive statistics for right and left-sided lesion and control groups on
measures of executive function
Std.
Measure Group N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
The Brixton Task control 40 5.73 1.71 2 10
(scaled score) right-sided
lesion
15 3.27 2.52 1 7
left-sided lesion 15 3.47 2.10 1 7
letter fluency control 40 50.35 9.71 31 80
(t score) right-sided
lesion
15 36.93 12.43 17 51
left-sided lesion 8 42.00 15.76 24 69
category fluency control 40 52.40 8.48 32 74
(t score) right-sided
lesion
15 37.67 10.62 15 53
left-sided lesion 8 40.75 13.24 24 56
(a) The Brixton Task
Table 17 demonstrates that the control groups' mean scaled score for the Brixton
Task was slightly higher than both the right-sided lesion and left-sided lesion groups.
However, the left-sided lesion group performed marginally better than the right-sided
lesion group.
As expected, Analysis of Variance confirmed a significant difference in performance
on the Brixton Task between the groups, F(2, 67) = 12.11, p < .001. This
represented an effect size (partial p ) of .265, showing that nearly 27% of the
variation in performance on the Brixton Task can be accounted for by lesion group.
Sheffe's post hoc comparisons were conducted to determine which pairs of group
scores were significantly different (Table 18).
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Table 18. Sheffe's post-hoc analysis comparing right-sided lesion, left-sided lesion
and control groups' performance on the Brixton Task
Mean 95% Confidence Interval
Difference Std. Lower Upper
(I) group (J) group (I-J) Error Sig. Bound Bound
Control Right-sided
lesion
2.46* 0.60 .001 0.95 3.96
Left-sided
lesion





-0.20 0.73 .963 -2.0 1.62
*The mean difference is significant at the .01 level.
The results shown in Table 18 confirm that the performance of both lesion groups on
the Brixton Task was significantly impaired compared to that of the control group,
thus supporting the hypothesis that both stroke groups would be equally impaired
compared to controls.
(b) Verbal Fluency (Letter)
Table 17 shows that controls performed better on the verbal fluency task than either
of the stroke groups with their mean t score being greater than right-sided lesion and
left-sided lesion groups. However, the left-sided lesion group performed slightly
better than the right-sided lesion group.
Analysis of Variance demonstrated a significant difference between the groups
F(2,60) = 8.38, p < .01. This represented an effect size (partial r|2) of .218, showing
that nearly 22% of the variation in performance on the letter fluency task can be
accounted for by lesion group.
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As predicted, Sheffe's post hoc comparisons (Table 19) revealed that both right and
left-sided lesion groups differed significantly from controls, but did not differ
significantly from each other.
Table 19. Sheffe's post-hoc analyses comparing right-sided lesion, left-sided lesion and
control groups' performance on the letter fluency task.
Mean 95% Confidence Interval











13.42* 3.40 .001 4.87 21.96
Left-sided
lesion





-5.07 4.92 .591 -17.42 7.29
* The mean difference is significant at the .01 level.
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(c) Verbal fluency (Category)
Table 17 shows that controls performed better on the category fluency task than
either of the stroke groups with their mean t score (M = 52.40, SD = 8.48) being
greater than right-sided lesion (M = 37.67, SD = 10.62) and left-sided lesion (M =
40.75, SD= 13.24) groups.
Analysis of Variance demonstrated a significant difference between the groups
F(2,60) = 14.84,/? < .01. This represented an effect size (partial p2) of .331, showing
that 33% of the variation in performance on the category task can be accounted for
by lesion group. As predicted, Sheffe's post hoc comparisons (Table 20) revealed
that similar to the performance on the letter fluency task, both right and left-sided
lesion groups differed significantly from controls, and did not differ significantly
from each other on the category fluency task.
Table 20. Sheffe's post-hoc analysis comparing right-sided lesion, left-sided lesion
and control groups' performance on the category fluency task
Mean 95% Confidence Interval











14.73* 2.93 .001 7.39 22.08
Left-sided
lesion





-3.08 4.23 .768 -13.71 7.54
* The mean difference is significant at the .01 level.
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3.3.2 Anterior versus Posterior Stroke
It was hypothesised that individuals with anterior lesions would be more impaired on
measures of executive function compared to individuals with posterior lesions and
controls. Descriptive statistics for the anterior and posterior lesion groups'
performance on The Brixton Task and letter and category Verbal Fluency tasks are
shown in Table 21. Seven individuals in the anterior lesion group had missing data
for tasks of verbal fluency. These were the same individuals with missing data in the
left sided-lesion stroke group due to expressive dysphasia.
Table 21. Descriptive statistics for anterior and posterior lesion and control
groups on measures of executive function.
Std.
Measure Group N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
The Brixton Task control 40 5.73 1.71 2 10
(scaled score) anterior lesion 13 2.69 1.80 1 6
posterior lesion 17 3.88 2.52 I 7
letter fluency control 40 50.35 9.71 31 80
(t score) anterior lesion 7 37.57 12.01 19 50
posterior lesion 16 39.19 14.51 17 69
category fluency control 40 52.40 8.48 32 74
(t score) anterior lesion 7 44.00 8.50 30 56
posterior lesion 16 36.44 11.63 15 55
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(a) The Brixton Task
Table 21 demonstrates that the control groups mean scaled score for the Brixton Task
was higher than both the anterior and posterior lesion groups. However, as
predicted, the anterior lesion group scored lower than the posterior lesion group
indicating poorer performance on this task.
Analysis of Variance demonstrated a significant difference in performance on the
Brixton Task between the groups F(2, 67) = 13.92, p < .01. This represented an
effect size (partial p2) of .294 indicating that 29% of the variance in performance can
be accounted for by lesion group. Sheffe's post hoc comparisons demonstrated that
both anterior and posterior lesion groups were significantly impaired on the Brixton
task compared to the control group, but did not differ significantly from each other
(Table 22). Thus, the above hypothesis has not been supported.
Table 22. ShefTe's post hoc analyses comparing anterior and posterior lesion and
control groups' performance on the Brixton Task.
Mean 95% Confidence Interval











3.03* 0.62 .001 1.47 4.59
posterior
lesion





-1.19 .718 .260 -2.99 0.61
* The mean difference is significant at the .01 level.
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(b) Verbal Fluency (Letter)
As shown in Table 21, the mean t score for verbal fluency was lower in the anterior
(M = 37.57, SD = 12.01) and posterior (M = 39.19, SD = 14.51) lesion groups
compared to controls (M = 50.35, SD = 9.71). Table 21 also demonstrates that the
anterior lesion group performed the poorest, although both stroke groups'
performance fell within the impaired range. As expected, Analysis of Variance
revealed these differences to be significant. F(2, 60) = 7.77, p < .01 represents an
effect size (partial p2) of .206, indicating that just over 20% of the variation in
performance on the letter fluency task can be accounted for by lesion group.
Sheffe's post hoc comparisons were conducted to determine which pairs of group
scores were significantly different (Table 23). Table 23 shows that both anterior and
posterior lesion groups differed significantly from controls, but did not differ
significantly from each other. This was an unexpected finding that does not support
the hypothesis that anterior brain lesions would be more detrimental to performance
on executive function tasks compared to posterior brain lesions.
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Table 23. Sheffe's post hoc analyses comparing anterior and posterior lesion
and control groups' performance on the letter fluency task.
Mean 95% Confidence Interval











12.78* 4.64 .028 1.13 24.43
posterior
lesion




lesion -1.62 5.13 .952 -14.50 11.27
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
(c) Verbal Fluency (Category)
As demonstrated in Table 21, controls (M = 52.40, SD = 8.48) performed better on
the category fluency task compared to both anterior (M = 44.00, SD = 8.50) and
posterior (M = 36.44, SD = 11.63) lesion groups. However, in contrast to the stroke
groups' performances on the letter fluency task, the posterior group's performance
was the poorest on the category fluency task and the only stroke group to perform
within the impaired range. Interestingly, the anterior group performed within the
average range, albeit at the low average end of the scale.
As expected, Analysis ofVariance demonstrated a significant difference between the
groups F (2, 60) = 16.75, p < .01. This represented an effect size (partial r)2) of .358,
showing that nearly 36% of the variation in performance on the category fluency task
can be accounted for by lesion group. Sheffe's post hoc comparisons were
conducted to determine which pairs of group scores were significantly different
(Table 24).
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Table 24. Sheffe's post hoc analyses comparing anterior and posterior lesion
and control groups performance on the category fluency task.
Mean 95% Confidence Interval











8.40 3.88 .105 -1.34 18.14
posterior
lesion





7.56 4.29 .220 -3.21 18.33
* The mean difference is significant at the .01 level.
The results shown in Table 24 indicate that the only significant difference on the
category fluency task was between the posterior lesion group's performance and
controls. This again was an unexpected finding that does not support the hypothesis
that individuals with anterior lesions would perform significantly worse on tasks of
executive function compared to individuals with posterior lesions.
3.3.3 Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX)
The DEX questionnaire was used to investigate the degree of awareness stroke
individuals' had in relation to executive function difficulties. Individuals rated
themselves in terms of dysexecutive problems and were additionally rated by
someone who knew them well (see section 2.3.6 in Method section). Comparisons
between right and left-sided lesion groups and anterior and posterior lesion groups
were undertaken. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 25.
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Table 25. Descriptive statistics for right and left-sided lesion and anterior and
posterior lesion groups on the Dysexecutive questionnaire (DEX).






















15 12.27 10.76 1 43
left-sided
lesion







































17 11.59 10.89 0 43
* DEX = Dysexecutive questionnaire; Self rating is completed by patient;
Independent rating is the questionnaire completed by someone who has at least daily
contact with the patient
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(a) Right versus Left sided Stroke
It was hypothesised that individuals with right-sided stroke would score themselves
significantly lower on the DEX compared to individuals with left-sided stroke and
independent raters. However, this hypothesis was not supported. As Table 25
shows, the right-sided lesion stroke group rated themselves slightly higher on the
DEX questionnaire compared to the left-sided lesion group, although this difference
was not significant, F(l, 28) = .08, p = .935 ns. Independent raters also scored
patients in the right-sided lesion group higher than those in the left-sided lesion
group. Interestingly, the left sided lesion group scored themselves as having greater
difficulties than the independent raters believed them to have.
(b) Anterior versus Posterior Stroke
It was hypothesised that individuals with anterior lesions, a group commonly
associated with insight problems, would rate themselves significantly lower than
individuals with posterior lesions. However, Table 25 shows that the anterior lesion
group (M = 11.62) actually rated themselves as having more executive function
related difficulties than the posterior group (M = 11.59) rated themselves to have.
However, the difference between the groups was slight and found not to be not
significant, F( 1, 28) = 1.3, p = .718 ns. Similarly, the independent raters also scored
the anterior lesion group as having slightly more difficulties than the group with
posterior lesions. The range of scores shown in Table 25 suggest that those in the
anterior group were perhaps less aware of their difficulties.
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3.4 Theory of Mind (ToM) and Executive function
3.4.1 Correlational Analyses
It was hypothesised that amongst stroke patients there would be a significant and
positive relationship between measures of executive function and ToM. There is
debate in the theory of mind (ToM) literature as to whether ToM is an independent
construct. It has been suggested that poor performance on ToM type tasks are
attributable to deficits in executive function and that ToM is not a separate ability at
all. In general, factors such as age, years of education, IQ and depression are also
known to influence cognitive functioning. Therefore, to determine the direction and
strength of associations between the variables in this study, Pearson product moment
correlational analyses were conducted using the stroke participants' data only.
In particular, analyses included stroke participants' data on the Eyes Test, which is
believed to measure ToM, and the Eyes Control Test that requires participants to
indicate the sex and age of the person (see section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). Similarly, stroke
participants' performance data on the Brixton Task, Verbal Fluency task, and
dysexecutive (DEX) questionnaire, routinely used as measures of executive
functioning was also included. Age, IQ, and depression scores were also included in
analyses to investigate their relationship with both the ToM and executive function
tasks. The analyses revealed a number of significant correlations (see Appendix 13
for full analyses). However, only the most relevant and interesting findings will be
reported (Table 26).
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Table 26. Pearson correlations between the Eyes and Eyes Control tests, the Brixton
Task, Verbal Fluency (letter and category fluency trials), Dysexecutive (DEX)










































































































































































N 30 30 30 30 23 23 23 30 30
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
+ National Adult Reading test
* ^ Dysexecutive Questionnaire
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As expected, Table 26 demonstrates that performance on the theory of mind Eyes
Test was moderately related to performances on the Brixton task (r = .39, p < .01,
two-tailed). However, although performances on the letter fluency (r = .23,p = .294
ns, two-tailed) and category fluency (r = .33, p = .126 ns, two=tailed) tasks were
positively associated with performance on the Eyes Test, the strength of association
was weak and these findings were not significant. Therefore, these findings only
partly support the hypothesis that there would be a significant relationship between
performance on all measures of executive function and the Eyes Test.
Similarly, performance on the Eyes Test was also positively associated with
performance on the Beck depression inventory (BDI-II) (r = .29, p = .120 ns)
although the strength of association was weak and non significant. Interestingly,
stroke participants' performance on the Eyes Test was found to be negatively related
to age (r = -.42, p = .02, two-tailed), although was not significantly associated with
years of education (r = .01,= 1.00 ns, two-tailed) (see Appendix 13) or IQ (r = .26,
p = .234 ns, two-tailed).
Table 26 also shows that, interestingly, performance on the Brixton Task was not
significantly associated with either letter (r = .20, p = .369 ns, two=tailed) or
category (r = .20, p = .357 ns, two-tailed) fluency. The fluency measures were
however strongly and significantly associated with each other (r = .724, p = < .01,
two-tailed). Performance on the Brixton task was also found to be significantly
related to age (r = -.46, p < .01, two-tailed), years of education (r = .45, p < .01, two-
tailed) (see Appendix 13), and IQ (r = .44, p < .05, two-tailed).
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It was also of interest that performance on the dysexecutive (DEX) questionnaire was
not significantly associated with performances on the Brixton task (r = .01, p = .945
ns, two-tailed) or letter (r = .18,p = .409 ns, two-tailed) or category (r = .60,p = .785
ns, two-tailed) fluency tasks all of which are argued to measure executive function.
It should also be noted that performance on the Eyes Test was negatively associated
with performance on the DEX (r = -.1 \,p = .548 ns, two-tailed) although this finding
was not significant.
3.4.2 Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA)
It was hypothesised that executive function deficits would not fully account for
impairments in ToM ability amongst stroke patients. Due to the associations found
between stroke participants' performance on the theory of mind (ToM) Eyes Test, a
measure of executive function (Brixton Task), depression and age, an analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted controlling for these factors.* The findings
for the right and left-sided lesioned individuals are shown in Table 27. The same
analyses were also run for the anterior and posterior lesion groups (Table 28).
In psychopathology research, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) is an approach commonly utilised to 'control
for' group differences on potential covariates. However, Miller and Chapman (2001) describe the many
difficulties and inappropriate uses of using ANCOVA in this way. With hindsight, it may have been more
prudent to separate out these sources of variance by adopting a different experimental design. However, this was
considered too impractical for the purposes of the present study, and was the main reason the author partialled out
the variance by using ANCOVA. Readers are referred to Miller and Chapman (2001) for a fuller discussion of
these difficulties and related issues.
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Table 27. ANCOVA comparing right and left sided lesion and control groups
performance on the Eyes Test controlling for age, depression and performance
on the Brixton task.
Type III Partial
Sum of Eta
Source Squares df F Sig. Squared
Corrected
Model 619.651(a) 5 12.571 .001 .495
Intercept 967.229 1 98.113 .001 .605
age 95.522 1 9.689 .003 .131
Brixton (raw
error score)
22.485 1 2.281 .136 .034
BDI 20.084 1 2.037 .158 .031
Lesion group 308.982 2 15.671 .001 .329
Error 630.935 64
Total 16613.000 70
Corrected Total 1250.586 69
a R Squared = .495 (Adjusted R Squared = .456)
As the results in Table 27 show, age is the only eovariant significantly associated
with performance on the Eyes Task. Including age, depression, and scores on
Brixton dysexecutive functioning task did not notably alter the effect of lesion
grouping (right versus left) upon performance on the Theory of Mind Eyes Test. The
effect of lesion group is still significant F(2, 64) = 15.67, p < .01, representing an
effect size (partial r|2) of .329. Thus nearly 33% of the variation in performance on
the Eyes Test can be accounted for by lesion group.
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Table 28= ANCOVA comparing anterior and posterior and control groups








Intercept 964.623 1 74.394 .001 .538
age 79.944 1 6.166 .016 .088
Brixton (raw
error score)
29.500 1 2.275 .136 .034
BDI 19.016 1 1.467 .230 .022
Lesion group 110.070 2 4.244 .019 .117
Error 829.847 64
Total 16613.000 70
Corrected Total 1250.586 69
i R Squared = .336 (Adjusted R Squared = .285)
Table 28 demonstrates that again age is the only covariant significantly associated
with performance on the Eyes Task. Including age, depression, and scores on the
Brixton dysexecutive functioning task did not notably alter the effect of lesion
grouping (anterior vs posterior) upon performance on the ToM Eyes Test. The effect
of lesion group remains significant. However, the interesting finding is that F(2, 64)
- 4.24, p < .05 represented an effect size (partial r\ ) of .117, indicating that only
around 12% of the variation in performance on the Eyes Test can be accounted for by
lesion group. Overall, these findings support the hypothesis that executive function
deficits do not fully account for impairments in ToM ability, and demonstrate that
the Right/Left hemisphere division can account for more of the variation in




The Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (2002) report stroke as being the
most frequent cause of severe disability in Scotland, and consequently, a substantial
proportion of health and social care resources are being devoted to the immediate and
continuing care ofpeople who have suffered a stroke (Department ofHealth, 2001).
Although the consequences of stroke can vary significantly among individuals, the
impact stroke can have on individuals' lives and those of their families is great. In
addition to the more obvious changes in motor function, anxiety and depression
commonly occur following stroke and have been recognised as having a detrimental
effect on recovery and outcome (Robinson, 1998; Astrom et al., 1993). Cognitive
and emotional deficits are also common following stroke and are factors that have
been shown to constitute major obstacles to recovery and to achieving maximal
quality of life (Riepe et ah, 2004; Elinger et ah, 2002; Bogousslavsky, 2003;
McKinlay & Brooks, 1984). They can also disrupt processes central to social
interaction, which can result in diminished psychosocial functioning (Hochestenbach
et ah, 1998; Rasquin et ah, 2002). Owing to their often subtle nature, however, they
• commonly go unrecognised.
There is strong evidence that demonstrates stroke rehabilitation improves functional
outcome and enhances quality of life, but rehabilitation research has tended to focus
on physical or motor aspects of stroke. Relatively little attention has been paid to the
emotional perception or social functioning problems which can occur in stroke
patients. Consequently, a better understanding of these difficulties is required so that
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early identification of problems can lead to enhanced care and treatment and
adequate support for both individuals and their families. The main aim of this study
was to investigate a specific element of social competence commonly referred to as
Theory ofMind (ToM) in post-stroke individuals. ToM entails the ability to attribute
mental states in order to explain and predict other people's behaviour and is often
viewed as inherent to successful social functioning.
4.1 General Findings
In this study, 93% of stroke participants had suffered an ischaemic stroke, with the
remaining 7% having experienced a haemorrhagic stroke. The presentations and
recovery patterns of each can be qualitatively different and will be discussed in more
detail in the methodological issues section to follow. Relatively equal numbers of
males and females were represented in both the stroke and control groups. This was
deemed important because, although not investigated in this study, there is evidence
to suggest that sex differences exist between the emotional understanding abilities of
males and females, with females tending to display significantly better emotional
understanding than males (see Byrne, 1996).
4.1.1 Age, Years of Education and IQ
In terms of age, years of education and NART predicted IQ the stroke groups and
control group were relatively well matched with no significant differences being
found between the groups on any of these factors. It was noted however that the
control group had slightly more years of education and higher mean IQ than stroke
patients. This appears to be a common finding in brain injury research in general.
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This may be due to sampling issues or may be linked to factors such as socio¬
economic status, which is a factor commonly viewed as mediating the likelihood of
stroke amongst others.
4.1.2 Depression
There was a surprisingly low frequency of depression amongst stroke patients in this
study (7%), which is not in keeping with previous research findings that estimate the
occurrence of depression as being between 25 to 50 percent in stroke survivors, (see
Robinson, 1998). Similarly, Sinyor et al. (1987) reported prevalence rates for mild,
moderate and severe depression as 17%, 23% and 9% respectively in a sample of
patients admitted to a rehabilitation ward. Therefore, in relation to mood, the
patients in this study were not representative of stroke survivors in general. A
possible reason for this finding will be discussed later when considering the
methodological issues concerning this current study.
4.1.3 Time Since Stroke
With respect to number of days that had passed between date of stroke and date of
testing, the overall mean for stroke patients was 74.2 days (SD = 32.08). No
significant difference in mean number of days since stroke between the right-sided
lesion (RSL) group compared to the left-sided lesion group (LSL) was found,
although the median number of days was notably lower in the RSL group (see Figure
1 in Results section). Therefore, it could be argued that any differences found on the
measures used in this study between RSL and LSL groups were due to the
differences in time since stroke. However, recovery from stroke is very dependent
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on individual factors, including location and extent of lesion, therefore it is difficult
to be sure what effect this finding may have had on performance on the various
measures used in this study.
4.1.4 Location of Lesion
Using the classification system advocated by Bamford (1992) (see section 1.1.4 in
Introduction section) total anterior circulation infarcts (TACI) were the most
common presentation of stroke in this study, followed by lacunar infarcts (LACI).
Following Burgess and Shallice (1997), patients were also classified as having either
anterior or posterior lesions. Lesion evidence was based on medical interpretation of
clinical radiological MRI or CT report and information documented in medical notes.
However, there are a number ofproblems inherent to reliance on medical note entries
and scan results in addition to the problems with classification systems themselves.
These methodological issues are discussed in more detail in section 4.4.
4.2 Findings in Relation to Specific Hypotheses
4.2.1 Theory of Mind
4.2.1 (a) Right versus Left Stroke
The Eves Test
It was hypothesised that individuals with right-hemisphere lesions would perform
significantly worse on the Eyes Test, a task commonly believed to measure theory of
mind (ToM), compared to individuals with left-hemisphere lesions and controls.
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The results demonstrated that The RHL group's performance on the theory of mind
Eyes Test was significantly poorer than both the LHL group and control group,
whose performances did not differ significantly from each other. Results also
showed that nearly 36% of the variance could be accounted for by lesion group.
Thus, the results support this hypothesis, and are in keeping with those reported by
Happe et al (1999). This finding is perhaps not surprising, however, considering that
RHL individuals are known to show pragmatic and social difficulties and the large
amount of evidence implicating right hemisphere damage in impairments of social
awareness and behaviour and emotional perception (Carota et al., 2002; Zdgaljardic
et al., 2002; Borod et al., 1998). Nonetheless, it is interesting that Happe et al's
(1999) findings have been replicated, despite using a different ToM measure in this
study and suggest the right hemisphere as having an important role in supporting
ToM ability. These findings also lend support to the fact that impairments in ToM
can be acquired following stroke, similar to other forms of brain injury.
It was further hypothesised that there would be no significant differences between
the groups' performance on the Eyes Control Task. This hypothesis was also
supported, and in line with previous research findings (Baron-Cohen et al, 2001;
Happe et al., 1999). There was, however, an apparent ceiling effect in performance
on this task. This finding suggests that the task was in some way too easy and
perhaps not suitable as a control task for the ToM Eyes Test. On the other hand, it
does suggest that individuals were able to adequately see the task photographs,
giving more confidence that the findings of the RHL groups poor performance on the
ToM Eyes Test was unlikely to be due to visual acuity problems.
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4.2.1 (b) Anterior versus Posterior Stroke
The Eves Test
An additional hypothesis of this study in relation to the Eyes Test was that
individual's with anterior lesions would perform significantly worse on this measure
compared to individual's with posterior lesions and controls. However, the results
did not support this hypothesis. Both stroke groups' (anterior and posterior)
performed significantly worse than the control group, but did not differ significantly
from each other. Although not significant, a quite unexpected finding was that the
anterior lesion group actually performed marginally better than the posterior lesion
group.
It was thought that damage to the anterior region of the brain would impede
performance on this task because of research that has shown the frontal cortex to be
involved in ToM abilities (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994) and shown activation during
ToM tasks in imaging studies (Fletcher et al., 1995). One possible explanation for
this unexpected finding could be lack of specificity of lesion site. Owing to the
nature of stroke, it is possible that patients with anterior lesions also had damage to
non-frontal areas of the brain which were not detected by brain scans. This problem
is commonly seen in clinical practice. Alternatively, it is possible that the frontal
lobes have a more vital role in ToM tasks that have a higher cognitive component.
As outlined in section 2.3.2 of the method section, the Eyes Test is thought to tap the
affective aspects of ToM ability (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), which the frontal cortex
is perhaps not vital for. This would fit with Premack and Woodruffs idea of ToM
being a primitive ability and therefore supported by less evolutionary advanced
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structures (i.e. more posterior subcortical structures). An alternative conclusion
could be that the right hemisphere per se is more important in aiding performance on
this task than the anterior region of the brain; that hemispheric location of lesion is
more important than the anterior/posterior division.
It was also further hypothesised that there would be no significant differences
between groups on the Eyes Control task. This hypothesis was supported, although
similar to the findings in the right/left lesion and control groups performance on this
task, there was an apparent ceiling effect with the implications being the same as
previously discussed.
4.2.1 (c) Exploratory Findings
Although no specific predictions were made, this study posed the question: Is there a
specific lesion site (e.g. right anterior or right posterior) that is more detrimental to
performance on the ToM task than any other?
The results demonstrated that that there were significant differences between the
groups performance on the ToM Eyes Test. The right anterior lesion group was
found to have performed the poorest (n = 6, M = 9.50, SD 2.74) and differed
significantly from the left anterior group (n = 7, M = 16.00, SD = 1.83) and control
group (n = 40, M = 16.42, SD = 3.37), but did not differ significantly from either the
right posterior (n = 9, M = 10.44, SD = 4.95) or left posterior (n = 8, M = 14.62, SD
= 3.74) groups. The right posterior lesion group's performance differed only from
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the control group's performance. No other significant differences between the
groups were found.
It is interesting that the right anterior group did not differ significantly from the right
posterior group. It has been asserted that the most common sites of cerebrovascular
disease affecting emotion-related processing are the right hemisphere and frontal
lobe (Zgaljardic et al 2002; Borod et al, 1992). In addition, current models of
emotion and the brain emphasise a vital role for the posterior right hemisphere in the
accurate perception of emotional stimuli such as emotional facial expression (Carota
et al., 2002) Therefore, this finding is in keeping with previous research. It seems
that areas in the right anterior and right posterior regions of the brain are in some
way vital for successful performance on the ToM task used in this study.
The finding that the right anterior lesion group's performance did not differ
significantly from the left posterior group's performance is interesting. This suggests
two things. Firstly, it may be that this area plays a role in performance on the Eyes
Test thus implicating the right frontal and right and left posterior regions of the brain.
The interconnectivity within the brain would make this possible and would support
the idea of a widespread neural circuit vital to ToM ability. Alternatively, it may be
that power was not adequate to detect significant differences between the right
anterior and left posterior groups due to the small sample sizes. Indeed, the mean
scores appear to show a large difference between these two groups. If this is the
case, then results would suggest that lesions to the right anterior region of the brain
are perhaps the most detrimental to ToM ability with this group performing the
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poorest. Although possible, the results of this study do not provide unequivocal
support for this suggestion.
4.2.2 Executive Function
4.2.2 (a) Right versus Left Stroke
It was hypothesised that both stroke groups (right-sided lesion (RSL) and left-sided
lesion (LSL)) would perform poorly on tasks of executive function compared to
controls.
The Brixton Task
Results showed both the RSL and LSL groups to be significantly impaired on the
Brixton task compared to controls, but as predicted, they did not differ significantly
from each other. This result is also in keeping with previous findings showing
executive dysfunction as being the most common presenting problem in
neuropsychological practice following brain injury (e.g. stroke), irrespective of side
of lesion (Stuss & Levine, 2002).
It was also of interest that, although not significant, the RSL group performed the
poorest compared to the LSL group. Individuals with right hemisphere damage
characteristically have difficulties in the area of visuoperceptual functioning
(Hochstenbach et al., 1998) and therefore performance may have been affected by
the visuoperceptual component of the Brixton task; the RSL group's difficulties may
not have been entirely owing to problems in executive functioning. However, this
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suggestion may have been more plausible if the RSL group had performed
significantly worse than the LSL group, which was not the case. The finding that
there were no significant differences between the stroke groups suggests the Brixton
task and the Eyes Test are measuring different constructs, as would be expected, and
further supports the results found on the Eyes Test; the RSL group were not
performing poorly on the Eyes Test because of visuoperceptual problems.
Furthermore, this finding also suggests it is less likely that visual neglect played a
contributory role to the RSL poor performance on the Eyes Test.
Verbal Fluency
With regards to letter fluency, both the RSL and LSL groups' performances were
found to differ significantly from the control group's performance, but not from each
other. This finding supports the hypothesis that no differences would be found
between the stroke groups' performances on measures of executive function.
However, it was interesting to note that, whilst not significant, the LSL group's
performance was better than the RSL group's performance on this task and actually
fell within the low average range of normal performance (mean t = 42). This is in
some way counter intuitive given that the left hemisphere is viewed as being
dominant in language abilities (Lezak et al., 2004), which constitute a large part of
this task. This finding, however, may be explained by the fact individual's with
language difficulties in the LSL group did not perform this task (n = 7) and were
therefore excluded from analysis. Because of this, this finding may not give an
accurate reflection of the difficulties left hemisphere damaged individuals' may
possibly have with this aspect of executive function (i.e mental flexibility).
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Similar results were found for performances between the groups on the category
fluency task, further supporting the hypothesis. Both stroke groups (RSL and LSL)
were significantly impaired compared to controls, but did not differ significantly
from each other. As before, the RSL group were more impaired than LSL group,
who again performed at the very low end of the normal range. The explanation
given above with regards to language ability would also account for this finding.
However, it is also possible that the pattern of findings for both verbal fluency tasks
can be explained by deficits in processing speed, which has been found to be
significantly affected following right hemisphere damage (RHD) (Gerritsen et al.,
2003; Rasquin et al., 2004a). Owing to verbal fluency being a timed task, reduced
processing speed may have therefore affected the RSL group's performance.
Overall, however, these findings suggest that executive functioning problems are
common following stroke, irrespective of side of lesion.
4.2.2 (b) Anterior versus Posterior Stroke
It was hypothesised that the anterior lesion (AL) group would perform significantly




The results showed that, although the anterior group performed less well on the
Brixton Task compared to the posterior group and controls, the only significant
difference between the groups was between the performance of both stroke groups
(anterior and posterior) and controls. The stroke groups did not significantly differ
from each other. Therefore, this finding does not support the hypothesis.
It had been thought that that the anterior stroke group's performance on this task
would differ significantly from the posterior stroke group's performance because of
evidence that shows the frontal cortex as being important to executive functioning
ability (Lezak et al., 2004). Therefore, one explanation for this finding could be that
individual's in the AL group also had lesions to more posterior regions of the brain.
The difficulties with lesion specificity were outlined in section 4.2.1(b).
Alternatively, it may be that the frontal lobes are not the only vital region of the brain
for successful performance on this task. Indeed, Phillips (1997) points out that there
are many difficulties with tasks of executive function. They are often assumed to be
tests of frontal lobe functioning, which she argues is misguided. Individuals with
lesions that do not involve the frontal lobes have been found to perform poorly on
tasks of executive function (Benton, 1991), and therefore cautions against the use of
the term 'frontal tasks' because of this. Most authors agree that executive function
consists of a number of interconnecting control processes, which are perhaps not
solely dependent on the frontal lobes. Therefore this task may be tapping an aspect
of executive functioning that is reliant on structures other than the frontal lobes. The
above finding would support this view.
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Verbal Fluency
With regards to letter fluency, the results indicated that there were no significant
differences between the anterior lesion (AL) group and posterior lesion (PL) group,
although both stroke groups preformed within the impaired range and significantly
worse than controls. Therefore, these findings do not support the hypothesis.
Similar to above, it had been thought that performance on this executive function
task would be reliant on intact frontal lobe functioning, largely owing to the large
amount of evidence that suggests the neural substrates of executive processes lie in
the frontal cortex (see Stuss & Benson, 1986). However, the difficulties with this
view have been outlined above and may account for this finding. The problems with
lesion specificity also remain. It is interesting, however, that similar to the results
found on performance on the Brixton task, the AL group displayed the poorest
performance. An alternative explanation for this finding could be that, owing to the
small number in the anterior group (n = 7) compared to the posterior group (n = 16),
power was not adequate to detect a significant difference. In view of all these
factors, it is difficult to be clear why this result was found.
In terms of performance on the category fluency task, the results showed a
significant difference between both stroke groups (anterior and posterior) and
controls. The stroke groups, however, did not differ significantly from each other.
Thus, this finding does not support the hypothesis.
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In contrast to the letter fluency findings, the posterior group performed the poorest
on the category fluency task compared to the anterior lesion group, and was the only
group found to be within the impaired range. This finding is contrary to what was
expected, with possible explanations being the same as outlined above (e.g. lesion
specificity and problems with viewing executive function tasks as tests of frontal
lobe functioning). It is interesting, however, that despite the non significant results
between the stroke groups, there seemed to be something about anterior lesions that
appeared to be more detrimental to letter fluency performance, whereas category
fluency performance appeared to be more sensitive to posterior lesions. There is the
view that greater contribution of the frontal lobes is required for letter fluency
performance, but not category fluency, with patients with frontal lesions being found
to be impaired on letter, but not category, fluency (see Henry & Crawford, 2004).
The findings of this study are tending towards supporting this view, but are not
conclusive.
4.2.2 (c) Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX)
Right versus Left Stroke
It was hypothesised that individuals in the right-sided lesion (RSL) group would rate
themselves as having fewer dysexecutive difficulties compared to how individuals in
the left-sided lesion (LSL) group would rate themselves. It was further hypothesised
independent raters would score individuals in the RSL group as having more
dysexecutive problems than LSL individuals, thus indicating RSL individuals as
having less awareness of difficulties.
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The results showed that the RSL group rated themselves very slightly higher than the
LSL group although this difference was not significant. Thus, the first hypothesis is
not supported. Independent raters were found to score patients in the RSL group
more highly on the DEX compared to the LSL group. This finding therefore
supports the latter hypothesis. Compared to the LSL group, the range of scores
observed in the RSL group and the independent ratings of this group suggest that the
RSL group had less awareness of deficits, which is in keeping with previous research
findings showing anosognosia (lack of awareness) to be more commonly associated
with right-sided stroke (Giacino et al., 1998; Starkstein et al., 1992; Hartmann -
Maeir et al., 2002). Results also showed the LSL group rated themselves as having
greater dysexecutive difficulties than the independent raters believed them to have,
which raises questions about the reliability of the scores given by independent raters.
This issue will be discussed further when considering other methodological issues
(section 4.4), but highlights these findings should be viewed with caution.
Anterior versus Posterior Stroke
It was hypothesised that individuals with anterior lesions (AL) would score
themselves as having less dysexecutive problems compared to the extent of
dysexecutive difficulties the posterior lesion (PL) group considered themselves to
have. It was further hypothesised that the AL group would be rated as having greater
dysexecutive difficulties than the PL group by independent raters, thus indicating AL
individuals to have less awareness of difficulties.
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The results showed that contrary to what was expected the AL group rated
themselves as having more difficulties than the posterior group believed themselves
to have, although the difference between groups was not significant. Therefore, this
hypothesis has not been supported. However, as predicted, the independent raters
scored individuals in the AL groups as having more dysexecutive problems
compared to the PL group, which is in keeping with previous research (Wilson et al.,
1996). An intriguing finding was that the AL group also rated themselves as having
more difficulties than the independent raters considered them to have. Therefore,
this finding adds to the methodological concerns raised previously regarding the
reliability of independent raters observations of patients and, similarly, should be
treated with caution.
4.3 Theory of Mind and Executive Function
4.3.1 Relationships Amongst Variables
Theory of Mind Eves Test
It was hypothesised that amongst stroke patients there would be a significant and
positive relationship between measures of executive function and theory of mind
(TOM). This hypothesis was related to the argument that ToM ability is mediated by
the frontal lobes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994; Fletcher et al., 1995) and executive
functions (Frye et al., 1995; Ozonoff et al., 1995).
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The results showed that performance on the ToM Eyes Test was moderately and
positively related to performance on the Brixton Task, which is believed to measure
executive function. However, Verbal Fluency tasks (letter and category) were not
significantly associated with the Eyes Test although the direction of association was
positive. Therefore, this hypothesis was only partly supported.
It is perhaps not surprising that a positive association was found amongst all of these
tasks, albeit to varying degrees. As Fine et al. (2001) highlight, most tests used to
assess cognitive function are not pure; they inherently assess other aspects of
functioning. However, The Eyes Test and Brixton task were perhaps significantly
related because both conceivably have a visual component. That verbal fluency was
not significantly associated with the Eyes Test is, with hindsight, not surprising. The
Eyes Test is predominantly a non-verbal task, whereas the verbal fluency task is
heavily dependent on verbal ability. Overall, these findings suggest that performance
on the Eyes Test is dependent, in part, on some aspect of executive functioning, with
some suggestion that the Eyes Test is perhaps measuring something other than
executive function per se.
The results also revealed The Eyes Test to be negatively associated with age. This is
not in keeping with previous research (Happe et al., 1998), which showed older
adults to perform significantly better on a ToM task compared to younger controls.
However, more recent studies have also failed to replicate Happe et al's (1998)
findings (Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; Maylor et al., 2002). One explanation for this
contradiction may be due to different ToM tasks being used in each study. Happe et
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al. (1998) used a ToM task with a greater verbal component, which may be more
resistant to aging effects. The ToM Eyes Test used in this study relies more on non¬
verbal or visual skills. Therefore, this finding may be related to visual acuity, which
is known to decline with age, although the results of the Eyes control task would not
support this suggestion.
There was also a peculiarly low association between the Eyes Test and years of
education (see appendix 13). The results suggested these variables were completed
unrelated. Similarly, results also revealed the Eyes Test not to be significantly
associated with IQ, which is in keeping with the findings of Baron-Cohen et al.
(2001). Together, these findings suggest that ToM ability is independent of general
intelligence and lends support to the idea that the Eyes Test is tapping the affective
aspect of ToM ability, which has been argued as being more primitive in nature and
not heavily reliant on cognitive ability (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Baron-Cohen et
al., 1992)
Executive Function
The results also showed that the Brixton task was not correlated with Verbal
Fluency, which are both believed to be measures of executive function. However, in
retrospect, this finding is perhaps not unexpected. It is highly likely that both tests
are measuring different aspects of executive function (as outlined in section
4.2.2(b)), although there is also the possibility that some other factor (cognitive or
otherwise) was affecting performance on one measure and not others. The Brixton
task was also found to be significantly and negatively correlated with age, which is in
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keeping with previous research findings (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). Also, the
Brixton task was significantly and positively related to years of education, which
again is in keeping with previous findings (Burgess & Shallice, 1997).
Interestingly, the dysexecutive questionnaire (DEX) was not found to significantly
correlate with performance on the Brixton or Verbal Fluency tasks, which are all
argued to be measures of executive function. As outlined above, it is possible that
each task is measuring different aspects of executive function, but given the
methodological issues concerning the DEX highlighted in section 4.2.2 (c), it seems
more plausible that this finding is an artefact of this study.
Theory of Mind and Executive Function
It was further hypothesised that deficits in executive function would not fully
account for impairments in ToM ability amongst stroke patients.
Comparing the performance of right- and left-sided stroke groups and controls, the
results showed that age was the only covariant significantly associated with
performance on the Eyes Test, although depression and performance on the Brixton
task were also positively associated with performance on the Eyes Test. Controlling
for these covariants did not alter the significant difference between lesion groups.
The differences between the groups remained significant with hemispheric location
of lesion accounting for 33% of the variance.
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Similarly, in the anterior/posterior comparison, age was again the only covariant
significantly associated with performance in the Eyes Test. Controlling again for
age, depression and performance on the Brixton task revealed that the effect of lesion
group remained significant. However, only 12 % of the variation in performance
could be accounted for by lesion site.
Overall, this hypothesis has been supported. However, it seems that right-sided
lesions per se are more detrimental to performance on the ToM task used in this
study. This conclusion would be in keeping with previous research findings (Happe
et al., 1999), which showed the right hemisphere to play a particular role in ToM
ability.
4.4 Methodological Considerations
Although the results of this study lend support to the view that acquired impairments
following stroke are the result of damage to the right hemisphere, there are a number
of methodological considerations and criticisms that should be considered before
drawing any firm conclusions.
4.4.1 Stroke Participants
In relation to stroke participants in this study, 93% of stroke participants had suffered
an ischaemic stroke, with the remaining 7% having experienced a haemorrhagic
stroke. Although qualitatively different, it is thought unlikely that the inclusion of
haemorrhagic strokes (n = 2; one in RSL group and one in LSL group) would have
significantly altered results. On the other hand, a strength of this study is that it did
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not comprise a number of differing aetiologies, which is a criticism of many of the
studies conducted within the brain injury field of research.
4.4.2 Lesion Specificity
There are also issues concerning lesion specificity following stroke, which are
common to most brain injured population studies. The very nature of stroke means
that often individuals may have experienced asymptomatic strokes or transient
ischaemic attacks TIAs, which have been shown to result in infarction of brain tissue
(Bogousslavsky, et al., 1998). It is therefore possible that some individuals in this
study had damage to other areas of the brain that did not show up on scans, similar to
the findings following traumatic brain injury (TBI).
Similarly, the brain scans had in all cases been undertaken very soon following
stroke, presumably to establish cause of symptomatology and to guide clinical
management. As Happe et al (1999) highlight, the final pattern of tissue damage
may not be revealed by scans at this early stage owing to secondary physiological
processes, which could result in either further damage or recovery of brain tissue
being possible. Therefore, lesion information should be viewed with caution.
However, it is difficult to know the best way to overcome this problem, which is not
uncommon in other areas of neuropsychological research.
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4.4.3 Time Since Stroke
A related issue concerns the length of time that had passed between the occurrence of
stroke and date of testing. It could be argued that the individuals in this study were
still in the early stages of recovery, with mean number of days since stroke being
74.2 days (see section 4.1.3). It is well known that spontaneous recovery can
continue for a considerable period of time following stroke. However, the rationale
for testing stroke participants in the post-acute stage of recovery was primarily
because, in clinical rehabilitation settings, this is often the time when emotional or
behavioural difficulties become apparent. Such difficulties are also known to affect
rehabilitation progress (Hartmann-Maeir et al., 2002). Whether the difficulties found
in this study are longstanding, or not, would require further research. However, there
is some evidence to suggest that, for some individuals, these difficulties will remain
(Hochstenbach et al., 2003; Rasquin et al., 2004a; Happe et al., 1999), and therefore
early identification was considered important.
4.4.4 Depression
As outlined in section 4.1.2 there was a surprisingly low incidence of depression
found in this study. It may be that this was an accurate reflection of depression rates
in this particular sample. However, there is an alternative explanation. Information
regarding current treatment of mood problems was not gathered from patients'
medical notes. It is possible that a percentage of stroke patients were receiving
pharmacological treatment for mood disorders, which would have masked the true
prevalence of depression within this sample. This explanation seems the most likely.
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With hindsight, it would have been prudent to have sought this information prior to
testing and is a criticism of this study.
4.4.5 Measures
It is also possible that the findings in this study are the result of other factors
(cognitive or otherwise) affecting performance on the tasks used in this study, not
withstanding the criticisms of the individual measures themselves. Multiple
cognitive deficits are not uncommon following stroke (Rasquin et al., 2004), with
mental speed of processing being reported as the most frequently disturbed cognitive
function (Rasquin et al., 2004; Gerritsen et al., 2003). However, it was thought
unlikely that reduced processing speed significantly affected performance because
there were no time restrictions for completing the measures used in this study, and
the pace for completing these was set largely by the participants themselves. The
only exception to this was the Verbal Fluency tasks, with this issue already having
been discussed previously (see section 4.2.2a).
Variations in presentation of cognitive deficits are also seen depending on which
hemisphere of the brain has been damaged. The most obvious cognitive disorders
for those individuals with right-sided damage involve visuospatial abilities and
gestalt-type formation (Lezak et al., 2004). Left-sided visual neglect, often viewed
as being characteristic of stroke, is also common (Heir et al., 1983). It could be
assumed, therefore, owing to the visual nature of the Eyes Test and the Brixton
executive function task, that the findings in this study may be the result of perceptual
problems or neglect. This issue was briefly alluded to in section 4.3.1 where it was
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suggested that this was not the case. Further support for this conclusion comes from
the finding stroke participants were able to perform the Eyes Control Test well.
Indeed, they performed at ceiling on this task.
The design format of the Eyes and Eyes Control Tests response sheet also allowed
for the detection of neglect. It would have been apparent if individuals were not
attending to one side of the picture because their responses would have been limited
to b and d, or a and c on the response sheet (see appendices 2 and 3). However, this
was not the case. It may be that the minor modification made to the administration
of these tasks compensated for this, if indeed neglect was present (see section 2.3.2
in the Method section).
A further methodological issue concerns the Eyes Test itself. It has been argued to
tap the affective component of ToM because it involves a basic emotion recognition
element (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). It may be that the Eyes Test is actually
measuring emotion recognition and not the ToM construct. Therefore, whether a
theory of mind account is the correct one for the RSL group's poor performance on
the Eyes Test depends on what the Eyes Test is actually measuring. It is difficult to
draw any firm conclusions about the validity of the Eyes Test because a measure of
basic emotion recognition was not used to control for this. With hindsight this would
have been sensible, and not doing so could be considered a criticism of this study.
There were also methodological concerns raised by the patterns of findings on the
DEX questionnaire, particularly in relation to the ratings of patients by observers.
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These were briefly highlighted in section 4.2.2(c). The results found may have been
due to the fact not all stroke participants were rated by the same person, which
included members of both the nursing and therapy teams. Looking at the data
qualitatively, it seemed that therapy staff appeared to demonstrate a better
understanding of the patients' difficulties. It may be that nursing staff were so used
to seeing these types of deficits they underestimated their significance. In hindsight,
it may have proved more prudent to have involved the patient's spouse or close
relative, who may have been in a better position to comment on changes in
behaviour. Patients' own ratings on this questionnaire may have been influenced by
negative feelings about themselves. Many felt they were making slow progress in
therapy. In addition, the DEX does not stipulate a timeframe for individuals to
consider changes in behaviour within. It is possible that some individuals were
referring to frequencies of dysexecutive type difficulties that may have been present
prior to having had a stroke.
4.5 Recommendations for Clinical Practice
It is difficult to make firm recommendations for future clinical practice given the
methodological issues outlined above. However, the findings of this study suggest
there may be scope for improvement.
At present, individuals who have been admitted to stroke rehabilitation wards are
screened for mood disorders, such as depression, which commonly occur following
stroke. However, this practice remains variable despite recommendations (SIGN,
2002). In addition to mood disorders, the results of this study suggest that
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individuals who have experienced right-hemisphere stroke may be particularly
susceptible to deficits in an aspect of social cognition commonly referred to as theory
of mind (ToM). Impaired ability to attribute mental states to others can interfere
with how individuals use information conveyed through social interaction and can, in
turn, affect psychosocial functioning, disrupt interpersonal relationships, and lead to
reduced quality of life. It also has implications for rehabilitation and relevance for
relatives, carers and other professionals.
In view of these findings, it seems there may be merit in screening for these types of
social functioning disorders as part of routine assessment, and as Carota et al. (2002)
suggested, including social-related measures when assessing rehabilitation progress
and overall outcome following stroke. The Eyes Test is a quick and simple measure
to administer and score, and is relatively stress free for patients to complete. It may
be that using the Eyes Test, or similar, as a screening measure for these types of
difficulties would detect the often subtle deficits in this area of functioning.
Information gained through the use of such measures could be used to positively re-
frame problems as goals for rehabilitation. It is unclear at present however whether
remediation of this deficit is possible, but feedback and discussion with the patient
and significant others may highlight approaches that could be used as compensatory
strategies, such as conveying meaning or intentions in written form.
Clinical experience has shown that by providing a cognitive or psychological
explanation for observed behaviours can be extremely helpful for patients, families
and other professionals, even if it only serves to increase understanding of the
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individual and their experience. This allows an individual to adapt their style of
approach to meet the needs of the patient and can dispel any misunderstanding about
the motivations behind challenging behaviours. Furthermore, increased
understanding of the nature of any impairment in social functioning is central to
improved clinical management and rehabilitation.
4.6 Conclusions and Future Research
There is a wide range of behavioural manifestations of frontal lobe and right
hemisphere dysfunction, and theory of mind (ToM) impairment clearly cannot
account for all of these, nor is it likely to be responsible for all reported difficulties in
social cognition. However, despite the methodological issues highlighted in section
4.4.5, the findings of this study do appear to suggest that right hemisphere damage
following stroke is particularly detrimental to an aspect of social cognition
commonly referred to as ToM.
The findings of this study also showed a high incidence of executive dysfunction,
irrespective of side of lesion, but deficits in this area of cognitive functioning did not
appear to fully account for the impairments seen in understanding pictures that
required the attribution of thoughts and feelings to others. This suggests that the
ability being tapped by the Eyes Test, commonly believed to be ToM, is in some way
separable from other areas of cognitive functioning and can be selectively impaired
following stroke. These findings, however, do not allow for the conclusion that
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damage elsewhere in the brain cannot impair theory of mind ability, or that some
other factor, cognitive or otherwise, may have resulted in these findings.
There is scope, therefore, for further research in this area. Firstly, a replication of
this study including a measure of emotion recognition and an additional measure of
ToM may elucidate whether the Eyes Test is indeed a valid measure of ToM ability
or is simply a task of emotion recognition. Similarly, it would be of interest to
include a measure of visual neglect to clarify whether deficits in this area of
functioning can account for the poor performances on the ToM task used in this
study.
ft was highlighted in section 4.4.5 that the Eyes Test has limitations. One of the
main criticisms that could be directed at this task is that it is perhaps not truly
representative of the different kinds of information conveyed through social
interactions in real-life (e.g. gestures, verbal cues, prosody, and context). The Eyes
Test requires individuals to make judgments about another's mental states, desires or
beliefs based on viewing static pictures thereby excluding some of the rich
contextual information commonly present in normal social situations. It is difficult
therefore to delineate exactly which aspect of ToM is responsible for the poor
performance on the ToM Eyes Test. Further research in this area should aim to
establish whether deficits in ToM are due to difficulties with specific aspects of ToM
ability such as perspective-taking, emotion recognition, or difficulties with facial
recognition per se. It may be of interest to investigate these issues through the use of
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videoed ToM scenarios, which would provide verbal and gesture cues, as well as
context.
It was also highlighted in section 1.4.1 that the construct of empathy is also
conceivably linked to ToM because both require the ability to differentiate between
the self and others (Visser-Kaiser, 2002). Individuals with brain injury are also
known to display deficits in their ability to empathise with others (Grattan &
Eslinger, 1989). Consequently, it would be of interest to investigate the relationships
amongst these constructs and their particular contributions to successful social
functioning. Therefore, further studies that inter-relate perception of emotion, theory
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APPENDIX 1 -NATIONAL ADULT READING TEST (NART)
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List of target mental state terms for each item (in italics) and their distractors
practice jealous panicked arrogant hateful
1 playful comforting irritated bored
2 terrified upset arrogant annoyed
3 joking flustered desire convinced
4 joking insisting amused relaxed
5 aghast fantasising impatient alarmed
6 despondent relieved shy excited
7 annoyed hostile horrified preoccupied
8 contemplative flustered encouraging amused
9 irritated thoughtful encouraging sympathetic
10 dominant friendly guilty horrified
11 preoccupied grateful insisting imploring
12 contented apologetic defiant curious
13 pensive irritated excited hostile
14 panicked incredulous despondent interested
15 alarmed shy hostile anxious
16 joking cautious arrogant reassuring
17 interested joking affectionate contented
18 impatient aghast irritated reflective
19 grateful flirtatious hostile disappointed
20 ashamed confident joking dispirited
21 serious ashamed bewildered alarmed
22 embarrassed guilty fantasising concerned
23 aghast baffled distrustful terrified
24 puzzled nervous insisting contemplative
25 ashamed nervous suspicious indecisive
APPENDIX 3 - EYES CONTROL TASK RESPONSE SHEET
Answers are in bold italics
Stimulus A B C D
Practice Male 50-60 Female 50-60 Male 40-50 Male 30-40
1 Female 40-50 Male 40-50 Female 50-60 Male 50-60
2 Female 45-55 Male 25-30 Female 35-40 Female 25-30
3 Male 20-25 Male 30-40 Male 45-50 Female 40-50
4 Female 25-35 Male 30-35 Male 40-45 Male 45-50
5 Male 20-30 Male 35-40 Male 30-35 Male 50-60
6 Male 35-45 Female 35-40 Male 30-35 Female 25-30
7 Female 45-50 Male 35-45 Male 25-30 Male 50-60
8 Female 40-50 Male 25-35 Female 25-30 Male 40-45
9 Male 40-50 Male 20-30 Male 30-40 Female 25-30
10 Female 40-50 Female 30-40 Male 25-35 Female 25-30
11 Male 40-50 Male 25-35 Male 35-40 Male 20-25
12 Female 35-40 Female 25-30 Male 20-30 Male 25-35
13 Female 20-25 Female 35-40 Male 30-40 Female 30-35
14 Male 35-45 Male 20-25 Male 25-35 Female 25-35
15 Male 25-35 Female 25-30 Female 35-45 Female 30-35
16 Female 35-45 Male 20-25 Male 25-35 Female 25-35
17 Male 35-45 Male 20-30 Female 30-40 Male 45-55
18 Female 25-35 Male 20-30 Female 20-25 Female 35-45
19 Male 50-60 Male 70-80 Male 45-50 Male 60-70
20 Female 40-45 Female 30-35 Female 25-30 Female 35-40
21 Female 40-50 Female 25-30 Female 35-40 Male 20-30
22 Male 20-30 Female 30-40 Female 25-30 Female 40-45
23 Male 60-70 Female 60-70 Male 70-80 Male 45-55
24 Female 45-50 Female 25-30 Female 40-45 Female 20-25
25 Male 30-40 Female 30-35 Female 40-50 Female 20-30
i
APPENDIX 4 - VERBAL FLUENCY (FAS) RESPONSE SHEET
CONTROLLED ORALWORD ASSOCIATION TEST
(BENTON & HAMSHER 1976)
1. Give me the names of as many animals/occupations as you can think of.
2. I am going to give you a letter and I would like you to tell me as many words as you
can think of that begin with that letter excluding proper nouns (i.e. names), numbers
and the same word with a different suffix (i.e. all, always, altogether, e.t.c.). The
first letter is The second letter is JtWC. The third letter is .
F A s

















APPENDIX 5 - THE BRIXTON TEST RESPONSE SHEET
The Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test
'There aremanypages here which all have the same basic design on
them. There are always ten positions, and one ofthem is always
coloured blue' [point to filled circle on page one]. 'However the
coloured one moves around according to variouspatterns that come
andgo without warning. These numbers [point to numbers
underneath the circles] are just here to refer to theposition - there
is nothing complicated ormathematical about this test'.
'Now, as I turn the pages over, yourjob is topick upon thepattern
as bestyou can, andpoint to where you thinkthe blue one isgoing to
be on the nextpage. It's notguess-work -you can work it out. For
instance, imagine the blue one was here [point to position 6], and
then when I turn thepage itgoes toy, and then to 8, then top-you
might reasonably expect it next to go to 10
'From time to time thepattern changeswithout warning and then
it isyourjob to pick up on the newpattern as bestyou can. Doyou
understand?'
Give further assistance ifnecessary
'Obviously thefirst timeyou have nothing togo on, soyourfirst
answerwill have to be a guess - have a guess as to where the blue one
will be next'
Item/ Correct Subject's Correct/
































0-7 10 Very superior
8 9 Superior
9-10 8 Good
11-13 7 High average
14-17 6 Average
18-20 5 Moderate ave.




Item/ Correct Subject's Correct/






































This questionnaire looks at some of the difficulties that people
sometimes experience. Wewould like you to read the following
statements, and rate them on a five-point scale according to
your own experience:
1 I have problems understanding what other people mean unless they
keep things simple and straightforward
□ o Q Q DB n4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
2 I actwithout thinking, doing the first thing that comes tomind
□o Q EH2 D3 EH4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
3 I sometimes talk about events or details that never actually happened,
but I believe did happen
□0 Q EH2 EH3 EH4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
4 I have difficulty thinking ahead or planning for the future
Do eh EH2 O3 EH4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
5 I sometimes get over-excited about things and can be a bit 'over the
top'at these times
□0 Q D2 D3 EH4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
6 I get events mixed up with each other, and get confused about the
correct order of events
EH2 EH3 EIE
Sometimes Fairly often Very often
EHo Di
Never Occasionally










8 I am lethargic, or unenthusiastic about things
□0 Q n n
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often
□4
Very often
9 I do or say embarrassing thingswhen in the company of others
Do Di O2 D3 D4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often












11 1 have difficulty showing emotion
D 0 D D fo DB D4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
12 1 lose my temper at the slightest thing
Do Di D2 D3 D4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
13 I am unconcerned about how I should behave in certain situations
Do Di D2 Db D4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
14 1 find it hard to stop repeating saying or doing things once I've
started
DD0D Db" □4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
15 1 tend to be very restless, and 'can't sit still' for any length of time
Do Di D2 Db D4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
16 1 find it difficult to stop myself from doing something even if 1 know 1
shouldn't
Do Di D2 Db D4 de
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
17 I will say one thing, butwill do something different
Do D1 i I2 [ ".J3 .
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often
EH4
Very often
18 I find it difficult to keep mymind on something, and am easily
distracted
Do D1 I I2 ~ D3 i I4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
19 I have trouble making decisions, or deciding what I want to do W
□0 □, a an
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
20 I am unaware of, or unconcerned about, how others feel aboutmy •,
behaviour
Do L..]i . O2 D3 Q4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Veryoften
Copyright© 1996, the authors: No partof this publicationmay be reproduced,
in whole or in part in any form (except by reviewers for the public press)without






This questionnaire looks at some of the difficulties that people
sometimes experience.Wewould like you to read the following
statements, and rate them on a five-point scale according to
your experience of [the subject]:
1 Has problems understanding what other people mean unless they
keep things simple and straightforward
□o O D2 EH3 LH4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
2 Actswithout thinking, doing the first thing that comes to mind
□0 o D2 Da a
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
3 Sometimes talks about events or details that never actually happened,
but s/he believes did happen
- Do a d2 n3 EH4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
4 Has difficulty thinking ahead or planning for the future
Do EHi D2 O3 EZH4
Never Occasionally ^Sometimes Fairly often Very often
5 Sometimes gets over-excited about things and can be a bit 'over the
top' at these times
□0 D1 ED2 EH3 D4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
6 Gets events mixed upwith each other, and gets confused about the
correct order of events
□0 Q □; n □«
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
7 Has difficulty realizing the extentof his/her problems and is
unrealistic about the future
□0 □, Q Da D4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
8 Seems lethargic, or unenthusiastic about things
□0 EH1 • a Da n*
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
9 Does or says embarrassing thingswhen in the company ofothers
□0 □, Q Da □<
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
10 Reallywants to do something one minute, but couldn't care less about
it the next
□0 Q
. D2 Da da






11 Has difficulty showing emotion
□0 EHi EH2 EH3 EH4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
12 Loses his/her temper at the slightest thing
□0 EH1 EH2 EZH3 Q4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
13 Seems unconcerned about how s/he should behave in certain
situations
□0 EH1 □2 D3 ED4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often





Sometimes Fairly often Very often
15 Tends to be very restless, and 'can't sit still' for any length of time
□0 E3i O2 EH3 EH4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often





Sometimes Fairly often Very often
17 Will say one thing, butwill do something different
Do EHi EH2 D3 EH4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often










19 Has trouble making decisions, or decidingwhat s/hewants to do
Do Di D2 EH3 EIU
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
20 Is unaware of, or unconcerned about, how others feel about his/her
behaviour
Do D1 D2 D3 D4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
Copyright© 1996, the authors: No part of this publication may be reproduced,
APPENDIX 8 - EXAMPLE OF BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY
QUESTIONNAIRE (BDI-II)
Name: Marital Status: Age: Sex:
Occupation: Education:
Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully, and
then pick out the one statement in each group that best describes the way you have been feeling during the past two
weeks, including today. Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in the group
seem to apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be sure that you do not choose more than one
statement for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite).
1. Sadness
0 I do not feel sad.
1 I feel sad much of the time.
2 I am sad all the time.
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
2. Pessimism
0 I am not discouraged about my future.




I do not expect things to work out for me.
I feel my future is hopeless and will only get
worse.
3. Past Failure
0 I do not feel like a failure.
1 I have failed more than I should have.
2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures.
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person.
4. Loss of Pleasure
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the
things I enjoy.
1 I don't enjoy things as much as I used to.
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I used
to enjoy.
3 I can't get any pleasure from the things I used
to enjoy.
5. Guilty Feelings
0 I don't feel particularly guilty.
1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or
should have done.
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
3 I feel guilty all of the time.
6. Punishment Feelings
0 I don't feel I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
7. Self-Dislike
0 I feel the same about myself as ever.
1 I have lost confidence in myself.
2 I am disappointed in myself.
3 I dislike myself.
8. Self-Criticalness
0 I don't criticize or blame myselfmore than usual.
1 I am more critical ofmyself than I used to be.
2 I criticize myself for all of my faults.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes
0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would
not carry them out.
2 I would like to kill myself.
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10. Crying
0 I don't cry anymore than I used to.
1 I cry more than I used to.
2 I cry over every little thing.
3 I feel like crying, but I can't.
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0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual.
1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual.
2 I am so restless or agitated that it's hard to stay
still.
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep
moving or doing something.
12. Loss of Interest
0 I have not lost interest in other people or
activities.
1 I am less interested in other people or things
than before.
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people
or things.
3 It's hard to get interested in anything.
13. Indecisiveness
0 I make decisions about as well as ever.
1 I find it more difficult to make decisions than
usual.
2 I have much greater difficulty in making
decisions than I used to.
3 I have trouble making any decisions.
14. Worthlessness
0 I do not feel I am worthless.
1 I don't consider myself as worthwhile and useful
as I used to.
2 I feel more worthless as compared to other
people.
3 I feel utterly worthless.
15. Loss of Energy
0 I have as much energy as ever.
1 I have less energy than I used to have.
2 I don't have enough energy to do very much.
3 I don't have enough energy to do anything.
16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern
0 I have not experienced any change in my
sleeping pattern.
la I sleep somewhat more than usual.
lb I sleep somewhat less than usual.
2a I sleep a lot more than usual.
2b I sleep a lot less than usual.
3a I sleep most of the day.
3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can't get back
to sleep.
17. Irritability
0 I am no more irritable than usual.
1 I am more irritable than usual.
2 I am much more irritable than usual.
3 I am irritable all the time.
18. Changes in Appetite
0 I have not experienced any change in my
appetite.
la My appetite is somewhat less than usual,
lb My appetite is somewhat greater than usual.
2a My appetite is much less than before.
2b My appetite is much greater than usual.
3a I have no appetite at all.
3b I crave food all the time.
19. Concentration Difficulty
0 I can concentrate as well as ever.
1 I can't concentrate as well as usual.
2 It's hard to keep my mind on anything for
very long.
3 I find I can't concentrate on anything.
20. Tiredness or Fatigue
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual.
1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than
usual.
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things
I used to do.
3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the
things I used to do.
21. Loss of Interest in Sex
0 I have not noticed any recent change in my
interest in sex.
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2 I am much less interested in sex now.
3 I have lost interest in sex completely.
NOTICE: This form is printed with both blue and black ink. If your
copy does not appear this way, it has been photocopied in




APPENDIX 9 - PATIENT INFORMATION SHEET
Participant Information Sheet
Project title: Acquired impairments in 'theory of mind' and executive function
following stroke
I would like to invite you to take part in a research project to enable us to learn more
about people's experience following a stroke and how to help them more effectively.
Background
Sometimes after having a stroke a number of individuals have been reported
experiencing some difficulties interacting with other people, even though they did not
have these difficulties before their stroke. In addition, some individuals experience
difficulties with tasks requiring, for example, problem solving and initiation. This is
commonly referred to as executive functioning.
The purpose of this study is to investigate in more detail what social understanding
difficulties people do experience after having a stroke (if any) and to see whether this
has any effect on the way they behave.
What will I have to do?
This project involves looking at pictures and then stating how the person in the picture
is thinking or feeling. You will also be asked to do a few short tasks and complete a
couple of brief questionnaires. Altogether, it will take about 45 minutes to complete
all parts of the study. The researcher Jackie Hamilton will explain the questionnaire
and the tasks to you and will answer any questions you may have about the project.
Questionnaires
One of the questionnaires you will be asked to complete is designed to help identify
individuals who are depressed. Depression is a complex condition, and scoring highly
on this questionnaire does not necessarily mean that you are depressed. With your
permission however, if you were found to score within the depressed range, it would
be good practice for me to inform the Consultant in charge of your care.
Patient Notes
I would also like to request permission to review your file/notes for information e.g
about the type of stoke you experienced. This information will be kept in the strictest
confidence.
Do I have to take part?
No. Taking part is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to take part, you do not have
to give a reason. Any treatment or support you receive will not be affected as a result
of your decision. Similarly, if you agree to participate, I would also like to inform you
that you are free to withdraw from this study at any time without having to give a
reason. Again, this will not affect your ongoing care and treatment.
Confidentiality
All participant information gathered during this study will be anonymised, known
only to the researcher, and will be kept strictly confidential.
Please turn over the page
APPENDIX 10 - CONTROL INFORMATION SHEET
Participant Information Sheet (control)
Project title: Acquired impairments in 'theory of mind' and executive function
following stroke
I would like to invite you to take part in a research project to enable us to learn more
about people's experience following a stroke and how to help them more effectively.
Background
Sometimes after having a stroke a number of individuals have been reported
experiencing some difficulties interacting with other people, even though they did not
have these difficulties before their stroke. In addition, some individuals experience
difficulties with tasks requiring, for example, problem solving and initiation. This is
commonly referred to as executive functioning.
The purpose of this study is to investigate in more detail what social understanding
difficulties people do experience after having a stroke (if any) and to see whether this
has any effect on the way they behave. You have been invited to take part because
you have not had a stroke. Learning more about how people who have not had a
stroke perform these tasks is also helpful.
What will I have to do?
This project involves looking at pictures and then stating how the person in the picture
is thinking or feeling. You will also be asked to do a few short tasks and complete a
couple of brief questionnaires. Altogether, it will take about 45 minutes to complete
all parts of the study. The researcher Jackie Hamilton will explain the questionnaire
and the tasks to you, and will answer any questions you may have about the project.
Questionnaires
One of the questionnaires you will be asked to complete is designed to help identify
individuals who are depressed. Depression is a complex condition, and scoring highly
on this questionnaire does not necessarily mean that you are depressed. However, if
you were found to score within the depressed range, it would be good practice for me
to advise you to consult with your General Practitioner.
Do I have to take part?
No. Taking part is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to take part, you do not have
to give a reason. Similarly, if you agree to participate, I would also like to inform you
that you are free to withdraw from this study at any time without having to give a
reason. This will not affect possible future care or treatment.
Confidentiality
All participant information gathered during this study will be anonymised, known
only to the researcher, and will be kept strictly confidential.
Please turn over the page
What to do now?
If you would like to take part in the study or would like more information, you can
contact me directly at the address or telephone number below and I will be more than
happy to talk to you further.
Thank you very much for considering taking part in this study. Please discuss this













Should you have any concerns or complaints about the manner in which this research
is being carried out, please contact Dr Fiona Summers at the above address, or speak
to the principal researcher Jackie Hamilton directly.
m
APPENDIX 11 - CONSENT FORM
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APPENDIX 13 - CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES
I
CONSENT FORM
CONSENT BY PATIENT/VOLUNTEER TO PARTICIPATE IN:
Research study approved by Grampian Ethics Committee
Name of patient/volunteer:





I have read the patient/volunteer information sheet on the above study and have
had the opportunity to discuss the details with
and ask question. The principal investigator has explained to me the nature and
purpose of the study and the tests to be undertaken. I understand fully what is
proposed to be done.
I have agreed to take part in the study as it has been outlined to me, but I
understand that I am completely free to withdraw from the study or any part of
the study at any time I wish. I also understand that this will not affect my
continuing medical treatment in any way.
I understand that the tests are part of a research project designed to promote
psychological knowledge, which has been approved by the Grampian Research
Ethics Committee, and may be of no benefit to me personally.




I confirm that I have explained to the patient/volunteer named above, the nature
and purpose of the tests to be undertaken.
Signature of investigator:
Date:
